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Abstract: Psycholinguistic methods hold great promise for experimental 
philosophy. Many philosophical thought experiments and arguments proceed 
from verbal descriptions of possible cases. Many relevant intuitions and 
conclusions are driven by spontaneous inferences about what else must also 
be true in the cases described. Such inferences are continually made in 
language comprehension and production. This chapter explains how methods 
from psycholinguistics can be employed to study such routine automatic 
inferences, with a view to assessing intuitions and reconstructing arguments. 
We demonstrate how plausibility ratings, pupillometry, and reading time 
measurements can be used to examine hypotheses about automatic inferences 
in speech and text comprehension. Two experiments on inferences from 
polysemous (perception-)verbs provide evidence of a potentially 
consequential ‘salience bias’. Findings help assess intuitions about unusual 
cases and analyse a philosophical paradox (‘argument from hallucination’). 
The paper thus illustrates how we can adapt psycholinguistic methods for 
philosophical purposes and demonstrates the methods’ philosophical 
usefulness.  
Keywords: eye-tracking, pupillometry, plausibility-ratings, automatic comprehension 
inferences, argument analysis, paradoxes about perception. 
Much philosophical thought occurs in natural language, as thinkers read or write 
philosophical texts, discuss philosophical problems with each other, or engage in the 
subvocalized speech characteristic of conscious thought (Carruthers 2002). Philosophical 
thought is therefore bound to be influenced by the automatic processes that continually 
go on in language comprehension and production. Much philosophical reasoning 
proceeds from verbal descriptions of possible cases. In thought experiments, such 
descriptions prompt intuitions about what else is also true of the cases described, and such 
intuitive judgments are frequently treated as evidence for or against philosophical theories 
(review: Weinberg 2016, pace Cappelen 2012 and Deutsch 2015). Many philosophical 
arguments involve inferences from premises that describe a possible case, to conclusions 
about what else must also be true of it. Such judgments and conclusions can be generated 
by routine comprehension inferences, which, for example, have us automatically infer 
from ‘The secretary fell out of the window’ that the protagonist is female (Atlas and 
Levinson 1981), was initially located in a building, and was subsequently injured or killed 
(McKoon and Ratcliff 1980). While many inferences triggered by philosophical case 
descriptions may be due to domain-specific processes (like ‘mindreading’, which may 
generate intuitive knowledge attributions; see Nagel 2012, Gerken 2017), many others 
will be due to routine comprehension processes. 
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An important strand of experimental philosophy examines whether and when case 
intuitions have evidentiary value – and philosophers possess warrant for accepting them. 
Most of this work to date has proceeded by examining the sensitivity of relevant intuitions 
to truth-irrelevant parameters (like the order in which cases are presented) and infers lack 
of evidentiary value where it observes such sensitivity (reviews: Mallon 2016, Nichols 
and Knobe 2017, Stich and Tobia 2016). Partially in response to replication issues and 
theoretical challenges to the key inference from observed sensitivity to lack of evidentiary 
value (e.g. Horne and Livengood 2017), recent calls for an ‘experimental philosophy 2.0’ 
(Nado 2016) have suggested that research in this strand should (a) be refocussed on the 
examination of specific cognitive processes that underpin philosophical thought (building 
on, e.g. Nichols and Knobe 2007), (b) deploy the resulting understanding of how specific 
processes work, to develop ‘epistemological profiles’, which indicate under which 
conditions we may (not) trust the processes’ outputs (Weinberg 2015, 2016), and (c) 
employ such profiles to assess a wider range of outputs: not only intuitive judgments but 
also inferences in arguments (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017a, 2017b). 
This paper will discuss and demonstrate how experimental philosophers (and 
especially an ‘experimental philosophy 2.0’) can recruit methods from psycholinguistics 
to study automatic inferences in language comprehension and production, with a view to 
assessing philosophically relevant intuitions and arguments.1 To demonstrate the 
approach and illustrate its potential philosophical usefulness, we will present a case study 
on the process of stereotypical enrichment (Levinson 2000) and its role in the influential 
‘argument from hallucination’, a classical paradox about perception. This case study will 
contribute towards an epistemological profile of the key process: We will identify 
conditions under which stereotypical inferences predictably fail to lead to true 
conclusions, argue that these conditions obtain in formulations of the target argument, 
and present two studies – including one fresh study – which deployed different 
psycholinguistic methods to examine the hypothesis that under the conditions predicted, 
competent language users cannot help making inappropriate stereotypical inferences, 
despite knowing they are inappropriate (sic). The findings will support a novel resolution 
of the targeted philosophical paradox. 
Section 1 will give an initial overview of the psycholinguistic methods that have 
been used to study automatic inferences involved in stereotypical enrichment and other 
comprehension/production processes. Section 2 will present our chosen philosophical 
application: It will identify a cognitive bias (‘salience bias’) besetting the generally 
reliable process of stereotypical enrichment, and explain how the processes’ nascent 
epistemological profile can be used to assess philosophically relevant intuitions and 
arguments; a fresh analysis of the ‘argument from hallucination’ will suggest this classical 
paradox relies on stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. Section 
3 will explain how we have used questionnaire-based methods and convenient ‘offline’ 
(outcome) measures to study comprehension inferences and garner first evidence of 
contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences. The following sections will explore 
                                                          
1  For use of psycholinguistic methods in conceptual analysis, see Powell et al. (2014). 
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how these methods can be complemented by ‘online’ measures (which tap into cognitive 
processes as they unfold). We will explore approaches that use people’s eyes as windows 
into their minds: Section 4 will discuss a study that employs pupillometry (measurements 
of pupil dilations) to provide further evidence of inappropriate automatic inferences, in 
speech comprehension. Section 5 will report a fresh study that measures reading times to 
investigate inferences in text comprehension. Section 6 will present some potential 
methodological lessons. 
1. Automatic inferences and their psycholinguistic study 
We now introduce the automatic inference process of interest and then review the 
psycholinguistic methods that have been used to study it. 
1.1. Stereotypical enrichment 
Semantic memory is our memory for facts and ‘general world knowledge’, as opposed to 
personally experienced or ‘episodic’ events (McRae and Jones 2013, Tulving 2002). It is 
commonly conceived as a semantic network which doubles as information-storage and 
inference engine. In first approximation, such a network consists of nodes representing 
concepts and links between them that can automatically pass on activation from stimuli, 
verbal and other, along several pathways simultaneously (Allport 1985). When a concept 
is ‘activated’ it is more likely to be used by several cognitive processes, crucially 
including processes involved in utterance comprehension (from word-recognition to 
disambiguation) and forward inference: Links in semantic memory facilitate a plethora 
of probabilistic parallel inferences, in processes including language comprehension. 
According to standard conceptions of semantic memory (McRae and Jones 2013, 
Neely and Kahan 2001),2 the observed co-occurrence of features (things and their 
common properties, wholes and their common parts) and events (causes and typical 
effects, etc.) forges links between the respective nodes which grow stronger upon frequent 
activation and atrophy upon disuse. The more frequently we encounter tomatoes that are 
red (in the supermarket) or Germans who are nasty (in war movies), the stronger the links 
between the respective concepts become, the more activation gets passed on from the 
stimuli ‘tomato’ and ‘German’, respectively, to nodes representing ‘red’ and ‘nasty’, 
respectively. These concepts thus come to be stereotypically associated with the words: 
They are activated most rapidly and strongly, and come to mind first, when we encounter 
the words. The strength of these associations encodes information about the co-
occurrence frequencies in the subject’s physical and discourse environment. Such 
empirical knowledge is brought to bear in processes including language comprehension: 
While stereotypical associations do not determine the extension of words (Hampton and 
Passanisi 2016), they support automatic inferences from words (‘tomato’, ‘German’) to 
stereotypically associated features (red and nasty, respectively). 
Embedded in cooperative communication (Grice, 1989), such stereotypical 
inferences address the challenge of the ‘communication bottleneck’. Articulation of 
                                                          
2  Kahneman (2011, part I) provides an elegant introduction; textbook: Harley (2014, ch.11). 
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speech proceeds at a slower pace than pre-articulation processes in speech production 
(Wheeldon and Levelt 1995) or parsing- and inference-processes in comprehension 
(Mehler et al. 1993) – “inference is cheap, articulation is expensive” (Levinson 2000: 29). 
This bottleneck is mitigated by inferences which systematically draw on information 
encoded by stereotypes. This process of stereotypical enrichment is captured by the bi-
partite I-heuristic (‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’, Levinson 
2000, 37): Speakers facilitate and listeners devise interpretations that are positive, 
stereotypical, and highly specific, in line with the maxims: 
(I-speaker) Skip mention of stereotypical features but make deviations from stereotypes 
explicit (e.g. ‘male secretary’). 
(I-hearer) In the absence of such explicit indications to the contrary, assume that the 
situation talked about conforms to the relevant stereotypes, deploy (also) the 
most specific stereotypes relevant, and fill in details in line with this 
knowledge about situations of the kind at issue. 
We now review some of the methods psycholinguists have used to study stereotypical 
associations and the automatic inferences they support, alongside some of the key 
findings. 
1.2. Psycholinguistic methods 
Stereotypical associations have been examined through a variety of offline and online 
measures. Offline measures include plausibility-ratings (How plausible/common is it that 
a tomato is red?), how frequently and early features are mentioned in listing tasks (List 
common features of tomatoes!), and the frequency with which participants use a word to 
complete a sentence-frame (‘Tomatoes are___’) (cloze probability) (McRae et al. 1997). 
Priming experiments then serve to examine activation: Participants are presented 
with a ‘prime’ word, sentence (-fragment), or short text and then a ‘probe’ word or letter 
string, and have to, e.g. read out the word, decide whether the string forms a word, or 
judge whether the referents of prime and probe words both fall under the same category 
(e.g. good or bad). That the prime activates the probe concept is inferred from shorter 
response times, e.g. for ‘money’-‘bank’ than ‘honey’-’bank’ (Lucas, 2000). Varying the 
time between the presentation of prime and probe (‘stimulus onset asynchrony’) allows 
researchers to examine the time course of activation. 
Priming experiments have shown that single words, presented in isolation, activate 
stereotypically associated features rapidly, within 250 milliseconds (review: Engelhardt 
and Ferreira 2016). Event-nouns (Hare et al. 2009) and verbs (Ferretti et al. 2001) activate 
a particularly wide and complex range of features: Where the actions or events denoted 
typically involve particular kinds of agents, ‘patients’ acted on, instruments used, or 
relations between them (Tanenhaus et al. 1989), event words activate typical features 
pertaining to the fillers of all these different thematic roles. For example, the verb ‘dig’ 
activates the instrument spade (Ferretti et al., 2001), ‘arrest’ activates the agent cop and 
the patient criminal (ibid.), while telic verbs (‘washing’) swiftly activate both initial and 
resulting patient properties (dirty, clean) (Welke et al. 2015). Conversely, typical agent-, 
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patient-, instrument-, and location-nouns activate relevant verbs (Hare et al. 2005). 
Different words thus activate comprehensive stereotypes that can include perceptual 
features (e.g. small, dirty), evaluative features (e.g. mean) and functional features (i.e. 
involvement of particular instruments) (McRae et al., 1997, Ferretti et al. 2001). 
Patterns of activation of features by words thus represent comprehensive ‘event 
knowledge’ about the typical features of actions like sewing and washing: who typically 
does it, with what instruments, what consequences are typically caused or intended, etc. 
Stereotypes can represent such knowledge because they are not unstructured ‘bags of 
features’ but have internal (thematic) structure. In incremental language comprehension, 
activation of features is sensitive to thematic roles (agent, patient, etc.): Sentence 
fragments (‘She was arrested by the ___’) activate typical agents (cop) in post-verbal 
position only when they leave the agent role blank (as above), not when they leave open 
the patient (‘She arrested the ___’), and vice versa (Ferretti et al. 2001: Exp.4). These 
complex, internally structured stereotypes are known as generalized situation schemas 
(Rumelhart 1978, Tanenhaus et al. 1989). 
Various online measures have been used to examine the inferences from words 
potentially supported by schemas (e.g. from ‘S is sewing’ to S uses a needle). These 
studies typically use a ‘cancellation paradigm’ and materials where the word of interest 
is followed by a sequel that is inconsistent with (cancels) the hypothesised inference (e.g. 
‘… the job would be easier if Carol had a needle’; see Harmon-Vukic et al. 2009). If 
participants make the critical inference from the prior verb, their conclusion’s clash with 
the sequel will create comprehension difficulties, which require effort to overcome. This 
effort is reflected in different measures. 
Pupillometry exploits the fact that cognitive effort makes our eyes widen, so that 
pupil dilation is an index of cognitive effort (Kahneman 1973, Laeng et al. 2012). We can 
therefore examine whether participants make automatic inferences from words by 
measuring their pupil size during and after they hear sentences with sequels that are either 
consistent or inconsistent with (cancel) the hypothesised inference from previous text. 
Dilations prompted by ‘inconsistent’ sentences but absent from otherwise identical 
‘consistent’ counterparts are evidence of hypothesised inferences. 
Reading-time measurements can build on the fact that when we read (rather than 
hear) sentences, comprehension difficulties cause us to slow down, and trigger increased 
backward (right-to-left) eye movements, called ‘regressions’. The simplest way to detect 
slow-downs is to present text in small instalments of single words, sentences, or lines, on 
a computer screen, and ask participants to read at a comfortable pace and advance the text 
by pressing a key on the keyboard. Studies using this ‘self-paced moving window’ 
paradigm show that participants read the remainder of the sentence more slowly when 
subject and verb were followed by a patient atypical for that agent-action pairing, rather 
than a typical patient (‘The mechanic/journalist checked the spelling of his latest report’) 
(Bicknell et al. 2010, Exp.1). A similar finding was made for instruments (‘Susan used 
the saw/scissors to cut the expensive paper…’), despite the absence of single-word 
priming of typical patients (e.g. scissors-paper) (Matsuki et al. 2011). These findings 
suggest that readers make automatic inferences supported not only by stereotypes 
6 
associated with individual words (‘journalist’, ‘mechanic’, ‘checking’, etc.), but also by 
more specific situation schemas encoding knowledge (e.g. about car inspections) which 
are not associated with any one word but get activated by combinations of words (see also 
Metusalem et al. 2012). 
Eye-trackers record the position of the reader’s eye (up to every millisecond). They 
permit more fine-grained and differentiated reading-time measurements than the self-
paced moving window paradigm as well as analyses of regressions. Dependent measures 
employed in the study of automatic inferences include3 
- first-pass reading time: the sum of all fixations in a region of text, from first 
entering that region until leaving that region either in a forward or backward 
direction; 
- regression path duration: the time from first entering a region until moving past 
that region forward in text (unlike first-pass reading time this also includes time 
spent on regressions out of the region); 
- second-pass reading time: the sum of all fixations in a region following the 
initial first-pass reading; and 
- total reading times: the sum of all fixations in a region. 
A classic study (Rayner et al. 2004) examined inferences to typical patients 
prompted by combinations of verbs and instrument-nouns (consistent with the sequel in 
1, but not 2): 
(1) John used a knife to chop the large carrots for dinner last night. 
(2) John used an axe to chop the large carrots for dinner last night. 
Rayner and colleagues observed (marginally) increased regression-path durations on the 
(one-word) region of interest (‘carrots’) and (significantly) for the following (n+1) region 
(‘for dinner’), in (2) than in (1). By contrast, where the word of interest was inconsistent 
with inferences prompted by the prior verb alone (‘inflate’ in 3, below), they observed 
also longer first-pass reading times (gaze durations) for both that word and its sequel. 
(3) John used a pump to inflate the large carrots for dinner last night. 
Inferences with different support (here: schemas activated by the verb alone or by 
combinations of verbs and nouns) or leading to expectation violations of different 
magnitude (3  2) may thus affect different eye-tracking measures. 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) measurements often complement approaches that 
rely on the responsiveness of our eyes to clashes between expectations and subsequent 
text: In addition to the characteristic eye responses just reviewed, there are signature 
                                                          
3  Unfortunately, definitions of these dependent variables differ across research labs and software packages. The 
present definitions are from Clifton et al. (2007) and employed in the current study (see Section 5). 
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electrophysiological responses in the brain, known as ‘event-related brain potentials’ 
(ERPs) (Kutas and Federmeiner 2001, 2011). EEG measurements record electrical brain 
activity at the human scalp. By averaging, researchers can extract from such recordings a 
time series of changes in electrical brain activity before, during, and after an event of 
interest. The amplitudes, latencies, and scalp topographies of these evoked potentials 
were found to systematically vary not only with features of the linguistic or other stimulus 
but also with readers’/hearers’ expectations. For example, violations of expectations 
based on syntactic rules (say, failure in gender agreement between pronoun and 
antecedent) produce positive deflections in the ERP waveform that peak 600 ms after 
stimulus onset (known as ‘P600’). By contrast, violations of expectations based on 
knowledge encoded by stereotypes and schemas produce negative deflections that peak 
400 ms after stimulus onset (known as ‘N400’). 
ERP findings help us interpret the results of priming and eye-tracking studies: 
Semantic category violations (‘Dutch trains are sour…’) and conflicts with empirical 
knowledge (‘Dutch trains are white…’; when they are actually yellow) lead to the same 
N400 response (with similar amplitude, topography, onset, and peak latency) (Hagoort et 
al. 2004). This suggests that lexical and empirical knowledge is deployed in the same way 
at the level of associative processing – and may both be encoded together as components 
of the same schema. Second, ERP results provide subtle further evidence that schemas 
are not ‘bags of features’ but deployed in a way sensitive to thematic roles: While N400 
amplitudes indicate that the verb is expected where preceded by subject and object (‘The 
restaurant owner forgot which customer the waitress had served…’), even where their 
typical roles are reversed (‘…which waitress the customer had served’) (Chow et al. 
2016), this reversal prompts signature responses to syntactic violations (P600) suggesting 
participants expected the verb in the passive voice (‘which waitress the customer had been 
served by’), consistent with assignments of agent and patient-roles typical for the verb 
(Kim et al. 2016, cf. Kim and Osterhout 2005). Finally, ERP studies suggest that 
inferences prompted by combinations of verbs and preceding nouns are supported by 
more specific situation schemas that are activated already at the verb (Bicknell et al. 2010, 
Exp.2). 
The research reviewed supports a ‘cued schemas account’ of language 
comprehension and production: ‘Linguistic coding is to be thought of less like definitive 
content and more like interpretative clue’ (Levinson 2000, 29). Words and syntactic 
constructions (Goldberg 2003, verb aspect: Ferretti et al. 2007, Kehler et al. 2008) are 
used as complementary clues for indicating and accessing relevant semantic and 
empirical knowledge in incremental language comprehension and production (Elman 
2009). Relevant knowledge is encoded by situation schemas and other stereotypes. 
Increasingly specific schemas are activated by words and combinations of verbs and 
agent-, patient-, or instrument-nouns, as well as discourse context (Metusalem et al. 
2012). Activated schemas then support a multitude of rapid, parallel stereotypical 
inferences: At each point, receivers use the most specific inferences to flesh out utterance 
content, in line with the I-heuristic. The activation processes in semantic memory that 
support these inferences occur in language-comprehension and -production (Pickering 
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and Garrod 2013, Stephens et al. 2010). Stereotypical enrichment will hence occur not 
only in interpersonal communication but also in the kind of subvocalized speech involved 
in philosophical thought (Carruthers 2002). 
2. Philosophical Application 
We can draw on psycholinguistic research to develop an epistemological profile of this 
important process, which tells us under what conditions we may (not) trust the 
stereotypical inferences we automatically make (Weinberg 2015, 2016). This profile can 
then be used to assess philosophical intuitions and arguments. 
2.1. Epistemological profiles 
With some caveats, stereotypical enrichment is generally reliable. The strength of 
stereotypical association gradually increases through continued observation of co-
occurrence in the physical and discourse environment (seeing more red tomatoes in the 
supermarket, watching more war movies full of nasty Germans); it gradually decreases, 
as incompatible observations accumulate (seeing green tomatoes in the fields, meeting 
friendly Germans) (McRae and Jones 2013, Neely and Kahan 2001). Strength of 
stereotypical association thus encodes information about co-occurrence frequencies in the 
subject’s physical and discourse environment. To the extent that the physical environment 
is stable and changes only gradually, and the discourse environment is free from 
systematic misrepresentation (no war propaganda), probabilistic stereotypical inferences 
are therefore reasonably accurate. Second, the maxim I-speaker (above) has speakers 
make deviations from stereotypes explicit, and where contextual cues defeat conclusions 
of stereotypical inferences, these conclusions typically get swiftly suppressed (Faust and 
Gernsbacher 1996) or simply decay for wont of reinforcement (Oden and Spira 1983). 
Such processing largely prevents contextually inappropriate inferences from interfering 
with utterance comprehension and further reasoning. 
We now build up to a set of conditions under which the generally reliable process 
predictably leads to inappropriate inferences which go through to affect further reasoning, 
even so (cf. Fischer and Engelhardt 2016, under review). This cognitive bias arises from 
the way in which polysemous words are processed. Most words have more than one 
meaning or sense (Klein and Murphy 2001). A linguistic stimulus activates all semantic 
and stereotypical features associated with the expression, in any of its meanings or senses, 
regardless of contextual propriety – e.g. ‘mint’ activates the probe candy, even when used 
in a different sense (as part of the prime ‘All buildings collapsed except the mint’) 
(Simpson and Burgess 1985, Till et al. 1988). The strength of initial activation is ordered 
by ‘salience’, understood as a function of exposure frequency (how often a language user 
encounters the word in that sense), modulated by prototypicality (how good examples of 
the relevant category the word is deemed to stand for, in that sense) (Giora 2003, Giora 
et al. 2015):4 The more salient a sense is for a speaker/hearer, the more rapidly and 
                                                          
4  Exposure frequency cannot be directly measured, but is inferred from occurrence frequencies in corpora, familiarity 
ratings, or conventionality ratings (Giora 2003). Prototypicality is usually assessed through listing, sentence-
completion, or typicality-rating tasks (Battig and Montague 1969, Chang 1986). 
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strongly the associated situation schema is activated. The more strongly activated a 
schema is, the longer its activation takes to decay (Farah and McClelland 1991, Loftus 
1973) and the more effort is required for its suppression (De Neys et al. 2003, Levy and 
Anderson 2002). Salience imbalances can therefore lead to an interpretation bias, where 
utterances employ words in less salient senses or uses – but their interpretation is unduly 
influenced by the schema associated with the most salient or dominant use. 
Such a ‘salience bias’ (Fischer and Engelhardt, under review) is particularly liable 
to arise where less salient uses are interpreted with a Retention/Suppression Strategy 
(Giora 2003, 37; henceforward ‘Retention Strategy’, for short): Where utterances use a 
polysemous word in a less salient sense, they are often interpreted by retaining the most 
rapidly activated schema associated with the most salient sense and suppressing the 
contextually inappropriate component features of the dominant schema (Giora 2003, 
Giora et al. 2014). This Retention Strategy has been shown to be used in the interpretation 
of figurative speech (Giora et al. 2007b, 2015), crucially including (non-default) 
metaphor (Giora et al. 2007a). We would expect it to be involved, e.g. in interpreting 
metaphorical uses of the verb ‘to see’: According to a recent corpus study using the British 
National Corpus (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b), ‘see’ is used far more frequently in a 
visual sense (68%) than in an epistemic sense (‘I see your point’, 12%), a doxastic sense 
(‘as he saw fit’, 10%), or a phenomenal sense (‘Hallucinating, Macbeth saw a dagger’, 
1%).5 The schema associated with the dominant visual sense (‘vision-schema’) includes 
agent-features like S uses her eyes, S looks at X, S knows X is there, and S knows what X 
is as well as patient-features like X is in front of S, X is near X, X is there at the same time 
as S. To interpret epistemic uses in line with the Retention Strategy, most of these features 
get suppressed, while retaining the contextually appropriate agent-features S knows X is 
there and S knows what X is (yielding the interpretation, ‘I know you’ve got a point and 
know what it is’).6 
Frequently co-occurring components of a situation schema activate others (Hare et 
al. 2009, McRae et al. 2005). Where a frequently used word has a dominant sense that is 
far more salient than all others (like ‘see’), the components of the associated schema will 
frequently co-occur. Initial activation of contextually inappropriate schema components 
will then not only be strong (due to salience) but also complemented by lateral cross-
activation from other schema components. It will then be difficult to suppress only some 
of the frequently co-occurring components, but not others. Where some of them are 
retained for utterance interpretation, the others will remain at least partially activated and 
support contextually inappropriate inferences that go through unsuppressed. 
We have thus arrived at a first set of jointly vitiating conditions under which the 
generally reliable process of stereotypical enrichment is liable to lead to inappropriate 
conclusions that affect further judgment and reasoning:  
                                                          
5  A production experiment using a sentence-completion task determined the same rank order for prototypicality, with 
even higher preponderance of the visual sense (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b). We infer that the visual sense is 
more salient than the epistemic and doxastic senses and these, in turn, are more salient than the phenomenal sense. 
6  The eye-tracking study reported in Section 5 provides evidence that the Retention Strategy is applied here. 
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[Hypothesis H] At least when 
(i) one sense of a polysemous high-frequency word is much more salient than all others, 
(ii) the dominant stereotype (situation schema) is deployed in interpreting utterances 
involving a less salient use, and 
(iii) some, but not all, of the stereotype’s frequently co-occurring core components are 
contextually relevant, then 
(1) inappropriate stereotypical inferences licensed only by the dominant sense will be 
triggered by the less salient use and 
(2) these automatic inferences will influence further judgment and reasoning, even when 
thinkers explicitly know they are inappropriate. 
We have thus obtained first components of an epistemological profile of the process of 
stereotypical enrichment. We now explore how they can be deployed to assess 
philosophically relevant intuitions and reconstructions of philosophical arguments. 
2.2. Philosophical assessments 
Arguably, most of the intuitive judgments about, and inferences from, case-descriptions 
that philosophers make in thought experiments and argument rely on everyday conceptual 
and linguistic competencies which are also deployed in ordinary discourse (Williamson 
2007: 188) – and on the routine cognitive processes underlying these competencies. 
Insofar as these routine processes are reliable, the philosophically relevant intuitions and 
inferences should be reliable as well, and the intuitions they generate should have 
evidentiary value (i.e. the fact that thinkers have them, as and when they do, should speak 
for the intuitions’ truth). So just how far are those routine processes reliable?  
To address this question, some experimental philosophers have started to develop 
‘GRECI explanations’ (as we have called them elsewhere, see Fischer and Engelhardt 
2016). These explanations trace philosophically relevant intuitions back to cognitive 
processes which are generally reliable but subject to cognitive biases which generate 
cognitive illusions under specific conditions. At any rate when produced under these 
vitiating conditions, intuitions lack evidentiary value. For example, intuitive knowledge 
attributions elicited through the method of cases have been traced to a mindreading 
competency (Nagel 2012, Gerken 2017) that has been argued to be generally reliable 
(Boyd and Nagel 2014), but subject to cognitive biases including a focal bias which may 
assert itself, for instance, in thought experiments allegedly revealing contrast effects and 
supporting contrastivism about knowledge (Gerken and Beebe 2016).  
Above, we built up towards a GRECI explanation that traces philosophically 
relevant intuitions not to a domain-specific process like mind-reading, but to a potentially 
complementary domain-general language comprehension/production process, 
stereotypical enrichment, which we argued to be generally reliable but subject to 
cognitive biases including a salience bias. An empirically supported account of this bias 
will call into question the evidentiary value of intuitions about cases whose descriptions 
use familiar words in special senses for whose interpretation the dominant sense may be 
functional. Many philosophical thought experiments involve ‘esoteric’ cases involving 
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well-behaved zombies, envatted brains, twin planets, etc. These cases are described with 
familiar words, given rare new uses, for whose interpretation the dominant sense will 
typically be functional (in the absence of explicit explanations). To the extent to which 
the cases deviate from dominant stereotypes (e.g. the ‘zombies’ behave like us), the 
dominant stereotypes are then liable to support contextually inappropriate inferences. Our 
account of salience bias thus supports a variant of the ‘esotericity thesis’ that intuitions 
about esoteric cases are less reliable than about ‘normal’ cases (Weinberg 2007, 
Williamson 2007). Prior to further psycholinguistic investigation (including examination 
of the precise salience structure of the relevant words), it provides an undermining 
defeater of the relevant intuitions (Pollock 1984). Already nascent epistemological 
profiles which do not (yet) go beyond arguments for general reliability of the target 
process and the identification of a first set of vitiating conditions thus allow us to assess 
the evidentiary value of at least some philosophical case-intuitions. 
In cognitive psychology, intuitions are typically conceptualised as judgments 
generated by automatic inferences, that is, by autonomous cognitive processes that place 
low demands on working memory (Evans and Stanovich 2013) and duplicate inferences 
with heuristic rules (Kahneman and Frederick 2005). Such processes may issue either in 
explicit judgments (‘intuitions’) or conclusions that are tacitly presupposed in further 
cognition (judgment and reasoning). ‘Experimental philosophy 2.0’ seeks to extend 
epistemological investigation from intuitions to arguments (Nado 2016) and we now 
focus on automatic inferences driving philosophical argument. 
Our example is taken from the philosophy of perception, where philosophers 
wishing to merely describe perceivers’ subjective experience systematically use familiar 
appearance- and perception-verbs in a rarefied ‘phenomenal’ sense, which lacks 
existential, factive and spatial implications (e.g. Ayer 1956: 90, Fish 2010: 6, Jackson 
1977: 33-49, Macpherson 2013: 5; cf. Chisholm 1957: 44-48). We submit that it satisfies 
condition (i)-(iii) from Hypothesis H: At any rate for ‘see’, we have shown (i) that the 
verb has a clearly dominant (visual) sense and that the phenomenal sense is the least 
salient sense (above, Fn.5). We suggest that (ii) the dominant word schema is retained 
and deployed to interpret the latter (cf. Giora 2003, Giora et al. 2014): A situation-model 
that instantiates the dominant schema with specific patient-role fillers is constructed. This 
model contains a set of phenomenal features as a component, and these features are 
attributed to the target experience, in a variant of the common ‘feature transfer’ approach 
of metaphor interpretation (Bortfeld and McGlone 2001, Ortony 1993). However, (iii) 
what it is like to see something is strongly associated with the other features of the schema 
associated with the dominant use of ‘see’, as evidenced by embodied cognition effects 
associated with visual metaphors (Lakoff 2012, Landau et al. 2010). Accordingly, it is 
hard to retain only the phenomenal component and suppress the schema’s other core 
components. Hypothesis H therefore predicts that uses of the rarefied phenomenal sense 
will prompt contextually inappropriate (e.g. existential and spatial) inferences supported 
– only – by the dominant visual sense of the verb.  
The special phenomenal sense is then used to talk about unusual cases, like 
hallucinations. Where thinkers know little about the relevant cases (e.g. hallucinations), 
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conclusions are yet less likely to be suppressed through integration with background 
knowledge (cf. Metusalem et al. 2012, Fischer and Engelhardt 2017a), and yet more likely 
to affect further cognition (judgment and reasoning). We therefore regard it as particularly 
likely that ‘arguments from hallucination’ will involve such contextually inappropriate 
stereotypical inferences. 
In their traditional version, these arguments argue for the existence of mind-
dependent objects of sense-perception (‘sense-data’), which separate subjects from any 
physical objects in the environment (Ayer 1956: 90, Fish 2010: 12-15, Macpherson 2013: 
12-13, Smith 2002: 194-197, cf. Crane and French 2015: sec.3.1). Here is a classic 
statement that explicitly marks the special phenomenal sense used: 
‘Let us take as an example Macbeth’s visionary dagger [...] There is an 
obvious [perceptual] sense in which Macbeth did not see the dagger; he did 
not see the dagger for the sufficient reason that there was no dagger there for 
him to see. There is another [viz., phenomenal] sense, however, in which it 
may quite properly be said that he did see a dagger; to say that he saw a dagger 
is quite a natural way of describing his experience. But still not a real dagger; 
not a physical object... If we are to say that he saw anything, it must have been 
something that was accessible to him alone… a sense-datum.’ (Ayer 1956: 
90). 
The second half of the argument then generalises from this special case (hallucination) to 
all cases of visual perception: Since subjectively indistinguishable experiences 
(supposedly) must be mental states of the same type, and mental states of the same type 
must have objects of the same kind (mind-dependent or –independent), actual perceptual 
experiences must have the same objects of awareness as possible hallucinatory 
experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from them. 
But note the persuasive fallacy in the first half: Macbeth is meant to have an 
experience just like that of seeing a physical dagger. In the phenomenal sense (where ‘S 
sees an F’ means ‘S has an experience like that /as of seeing an F’), he therefore can be 
said to ‘see a physical dagger’ (his visual experience is, by assumption, just like that of 
seeing a physical dagger) – while he cannot be said, e.g. to see a translucent non-physical 
dagger (his experience is not like that). In the quoted passage, the move from 
(1) ‘Macbeth saw a dagger’ (in the phenomenal sense)  
to ‘but still not a real dagger’ is hence fallacious. We suggest the argument is driven by 
inappropriate inferences from the phenomenal use of ‘see’ to conclusions that typically 
remain implicit, but are presupposed in further reasoning, e.g.  
(2) There then was something that Macbeth saw. – But, by assumption: 
(3) ‘There then was no physical object for Macbeth to see.’ By (2) and (3): 
(4) ‘There then was a non-physical object that Macbeth saw’. 
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The inference from (1) to (2) would be licensed by the dominant visual sense of ‘see’, but 
not by the contextually relevant phenomenal sense which lacks factive implications and 
creates an intensional context not admitting of quantification (Forbes 2013). The same 
conclusion can be reached also by spatial inferences, also supported only by the visual 
sense (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b). Given explicit marking of the different uses in the 
quoted passage, more must be involved than a simple error of using the wrong sense of 
‘see’.  
Plausible principles of charity limit the extent of irrationality and conceptual or 
linguistic incompetence we may attribute to competent thinkers (Adler 1994, Lewinski 
2012). Empirical explanations of why competent thinkers commit fallacies are then 
required to validate reconstructions (Thagard and Nisbett 1983). Our proposed account 
of salience bias can explain why competent speakers should make contextually 
inappropriate stereotypical inferences from ‘see’ – and other verbs, used in other 
statements of the argument (Fischer and Engelhardt, under review). But is this account 
correct? Do competent language users make inferences licensed only by the dominant use 
of a polysemous verb also from rarefied special uses, as posited by Hypothesis H? 
2.3. Pre-study 
We used a battery of complementary psycholinguistic methods to examine this hypothesis 
about automatic inferences which speakers/hearers are not aware of making. The 
hypothesis boldly claims that under certain condition (i-iii above), competent language 
users will go along with contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences even when 
they know the inferences at issue to be inappropriate. In a pre-study (see Fischer and 
Engelhardt, under review), we identified potentially relevant inferences: Undergraduate 
participants rated spatial inferences from visual, epistemic, doxastic, and phenomenal 
uses of ‘see’, as well as from visual and epistemic uses of ‘aware’. For example: 
 [visual ‘see’] [epistemic ‘see’] 
[Premise] Mona sees the car on the road. Josh sees the issues in play. 
[Conclusion] The car on the road is in front of 
Mona. 
The issues in play are in front of 
Josh. 
 
Table 1. Spatial inferences from different uses of ‘see’. 
On a 5-point Likert scale, participants indicated their confidence that ‘in situations 
where the first sentence [premise] is true also the second sentence [conclusion] will 
typically be true’. They were very confident that spatial inferences from visual uses 
typically lead to true conclusions (mean rating 4.7 for ‘see’, and 3.7 for ‘aware’, both 
significantly above neutral mid-point ‘3’). They were also very confident that spatial 
inferences from the other uses examined typically lead to conclusions that fail to be true 
(mean ratings significantly below 3). They were most confident that spatial inferences 
from epistemic uses are inappropriate (lead to conclusions that fail to be true) (mean 
rating 1.58 for ‘see’ and 1.53 for ‘aware’). To get clear on whether competent language 
users make contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences under the conditions (i)-
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(iii) identified by our Hypothesis H, we therefore examined whether speakers/hearers 
make and deploy spatial inferences from epistemic uses of ‘see’, which they demonstrably 
know to be inappropriate.7 We accordingly examined the verb-specific hypotheses: 
H1 Competent speakers infer spatial patient-properties (X is in front of S) from 
visual and epistemic uses of ‘S sees X’. 
H2 Conclusions from all these inferences will be deployed in subsequent 
cognitive processing, regardless of contextual (im)propriety. 
3. Plausibility ratings 
3.1 Approach and predictions 
Plausibility ratings offer a convenient first means for following up hypotheses about 
comprehension inferences from specific words that affect further cognitive processing. 
They thus allow us to examine at any rate the conjunction of H1 and H2. Participants hear 
or read sentences like the following, and rate their plausibility on a Likert scale: 
1a. Matt sees the spot on the wall facing him. (‘s-consistent’) 
2a. Chuck sees the spot on the wall behind him. (‘s-inconsistent’) 
In these sentences, the expression of interest is followed by a sequel that is either 
consistent with the hypothesised stereotypical inference (‘s-consistent’) or inconsistent 
with it (‘s-inconsistent’). Our items have post-verbal contexts that are either consistent or 
inconsistent with the hypothesised inference from ‘S sees X’ to ‘X is in front of S’. If this 
inference is made, and not swiftly suppressed, then the clash with the sequel will render 
s-inconsistent items (like 2a) less plausible than s-consistent items (like 1a). 
This prediction holds both on a content- and an experience-based approach to 
metacognitive judgments. If the plausibility judgment is based on cognitive engagement 
with the content and an assessment of its probability, the clash of the s-inconsistent sequel 
with the conclusion of the probabilistic inference (e.g. in 2a) will make its truth less 
probable than that of its s-consistent counterpart (1a). According to the experience-based 
approach to metacognitive judgments (Koriat 2007), the subjective plausibility of a 
judgment results not from cognitive engagement with its content but from features of the 
underlying cognitive processes. Fluency or level of effort serves as a cue for a wide range 
of metacognitive judgments, including plausibility assessments (for a review, see Alter 
and Oppenheimer 2009). Perceived inconsistencies (as in 2a) reduce the degree of 
‘fluency’ or effortlessness of the comprehension process (Carpenter and Just 1977), 
which in turn reduces subjective plausibility (Thompson et al. 2011). Either way, lower 
plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent sentences than for their s-consistent counterparts 
would provide evidence for automatic spatial inferences. 
                                                          
7  If correct assessment does not prevent inappropriate automatic inference to conclusions presupposed in further 
reasoning, this will provide some support for inferences from findings about undergraduates to conclusions about 
expert philosophers, in the light of the ‘expertise objection’ (review: Machery 2015). 
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To show that the inferences of interest are supported by features of the verb (e.g. 
stereotypical features), we manipulate not only the post-verbal context but also the verb 
and replace ‘see’ in half the items by a contrast verb less strongly associated with spatial 
patient features. We employ ‘is aware of’, which is ordinarily used in an epistemic sense, 
to attribute knowledge that may, but need not, be acquired through the five senses 
(MEDAL, WordNet).8 A prior production experiment with a sentence-completion task 
showed that this verb is paired about half the time with visual objects as patients, which 
agents would be aware of in virtue of looking at them – whereas ‘see’-stems are provided 
with completions that give the verb a visual sense, over 93% of the time (Fischer and 
Engelhardt 2017b). We infer that ‘aware’ is less strongly associated with the vision-
schema, and spatial patient-properties, than ‘see’, and include items like 
1b. Matt is aware of the spot on the wall facing him. 
2b. Chuck is aware of the spot on the wall behind him. 
Again, content- and experience-based accounts support the same prediction from 
our hypotheses: The weaker association of ‘aware’ (than ‘see’) with spatial features 
translates into a weaker probabilistic inference (It’s less probable that the patient is in 
front of the agent), making it more probable that the sentence is true (the agent knew all 
along, from previous observation or testimony, that there’s a spot on the wall). Less 
strongly supported inferences are also easier to suppress, leading to less disfluency. Either 
way, s-inconsistent ‘aware’-sentences (like 2b) will be rated more plausible than their 
‘see’-counterparts (like 2a). If so, this will provide evidence that the inferences of interest 
are supported by features of the verb. 
To examine whether spatial inferences are also, inappropriately, made from 
epistemic uses of the verb, we finally manipulate the object. In the absence of contextual 
cues, concrete patient-nouns (‘picture’, ‘car’) invite visual interpretations of ‘see’. By 
contrast, epistemic readings are invited by abstract patient-nouns (‘challenges’, 
‘opportunities’, henceforth ‘epistemic objects’, for convenience), whose referents 
typically cannot be literally ‘seen’, but known. We use items like: 
3a. Joe sees the problems that lie ahead.  
3b. Joe is aware of the problems that lie ahead.  
4a. Jack sees the problems he left behind. 
4b. Jack is aware of the problems he left behind. 
In principle, perfectly plausible interpretations are readily available for s-
inconsistent sentences with epistemic objects (like 4): We can complement a purely 
epistemic interpretation of ‘see’ or ‘aware’ with a metaphorical interpretation of the 
sequel (before subject=future, behind subject=past; hence ‘Jack knows what problems he 
had in the past’). But incompletely suppressed spatial inferences from ‘see’ will prevent 
such purely metaphorical interpretation: Though conventional, the present space-time 
                                                          
8  https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/aware, 
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 
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metaphors give rise to embodied cognition effects (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002, Bottini 
et al. 2015) and support spatial reasoning about temporal relations (Casasanto and 
Boroditsky 2008, Gentner et al. 2002). We infer that these metaphorical sequels will 
activate spatial schemas that place objects in front of, or behind a forward/future-facing 
subject (Gentner et al. 2002). These schemas will be retained during comprehension of 
these sequels (Giora 2003, Giora and Fein 1999), and facilitate spatial reasoning from 
them (Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008). If spatial inferences from the prior verb are made, 
their conclusions will therefore engage such reasoning, and be felt to clash with s-
inconsistent sequels (‘...left behind’). These perceived clashes will engender 
comprehension difficulties and render s-inconsistent ‘see’-items (like 4a) less plausible 
than s-consistent counterparts (like 3a). 
‘Aware’-items will elicit different responses: Even if the association of ‘is aware 
of’ with the vision-schema is weaker, the combination of the verb with a visual object-
noun will activate the schema (cf. Bicknell et al. 2010) and prompt spatial inferences. 
However, their conclusions will, where contextually necessary, be easier to suppress than 
those from ‘see’ (above). Therefore s-inconsistent ‘aware’-sentences with visual objects 
(like 2b) will be deemed less plausible than their s-consistent counterparts (like 1b), but 
still more plausible than otherwise identical ‘see’-sentences (like 2a). By contrast, if the 
dominant use of ‘is aware of’ is epistemic, and any spatial conclusion is inappropriate 
where it goes with abstract epistemic objects, such conclusions should be swiftly and 
completely suppressed in interpreting ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects. For such 
sentences, we therefore expect spatial inferences from ‘aware’ will not interfere with 
subsequent plausibility judgments, so that the context-manipulation will not affect 
plausibility ratings – which should hence again be higher than for ‘see’-counterparts. 
We thus derive two key predictions from our hypotheses: 
[Plausibility-1] s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences, both with visual and with epistemic 
objects, will be deemed less plausible than their s-consistent 
counterparts. 
[Plausibility-2] s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences, both with visual and with epistemic 
objects, will be rated less plausible than their ‘aware’-counterparts. 
To sum up, we can test the hypotheses that competent language users make 
inappropriate stereotypical inferences from a specific verb (here: ‘see’), which influence 
further cognition, by using a plausibility-rating task and a 2 × 2 × 2 (context [s-
consistent/s-inconsistent] × verb [see/aware] × object [visual/epistemic]) design, where 
all variables are manipulated within-subject. 
3.2 Excluding confounds 
This design helps to exclude most potential confounds. The verb-manipulation helps us 
exclude spatial inferences from other parts of the sentence as drivers of plausibility 
judgments. First, patient nouns might be associated with a specific spatial orientation 
towards agents (e.g. ‘challenges’ are typically said to be ‘ahead’). However, if patient-
nouns were the prime source of spatial inferences, they should reduce the plausibility of 
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s-inconsistent ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences in the same way and falsify prediction 
Plausibility-2.9  
Second, in items with epistemic objects, the spatial inference might be triggered by 
the spatial time metaphor used by the post-verbal sequel. This metaphor activates a 
schema centred on a subject spatially oriented to look at things in front of her (Gentner et 
al. 2002). One might therefore argue that S looks at things in front of S is a component of 
this schema, and that s-inconsistent sentences like ‘Jack sees the problems he left behind’ 
will seem implausible because they clash with this component. However, in this case, 
both ‘see’- and ‘aware’-items with epistemic objects should be sensitive to the context-
manipulation. If this manipulation affects the plausibility only of ‘see’, but not ‘aware’-
items, we can exclude this potential confound. 
Third, lower mean plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences might be 
driven by existential or factive inferences from the verb, which are appropriate both with 
visual and epistemic objects (You can only see my point if I have one), as these too are 
cancelled by half our s-inconsistent sequels with epistemic objects, like ‘the problems he 
left behind’ (which implies the problems no longer exist for the agent), though not the 
others (like ‘the possibilities from which she has turned away’). However, existential and 
factive implications are shared by both ‘see’ and ‘aware’ (You can only be aware of a 
problem that actually exists), so that the plausibility of epistemic ‘aware’-items should 
again be affected in the same way by the context manipulation. 
Finally, plausibility judgments can be affected by word frequency, as more 
frequently encountered words are easier to process (Oppenheimer 2006) and higher 
fluency may serve as metacognitive cue anchoring plausibility judgments (Alter and 
Oppenheimer 2009). While this is no major issue in the present studies (since we predict 
lower plausibility rankings for items using the more frequent ‘see’, and mean frequencies 
for our forward and backward terms are very similar) we can assess the extent to which 
frequency influences participants’ ratings by constructing ‘frequency-congruent’ filler 
items where the sentence with the more frequent verb is also more consistent with its 
associated stereotype, and ‘frequency-reversed’ filler items, where word-frequency and 
stereotype-consistency work in opposite directions. If participants make judgments 
predominantly in line with stereotype-consistency, and no fewer such judgments about 
frequency-reversed than frequency-congruent items, their plausibility judgments are 
unlikely to be influenced by frequency, and we can assess whether their ratings (still) bear 
out our predictions (Fischer and Engelhardt 2016). 
Since philosophical thought takes place in both speech (oral debate) and text 
(reading and writing), we investigated inferences in both modalities. We employed the 
plausibility-rating paradigm described in two studies, in which participants heard and read 
                                                          
9  We investigated this possibility, even so: In a norming study, participants considered the patient nouns used in 
Study 1 (Section 4), in ‘aware’-contexts (e.g. ‘Joe is aware of the problems’, etc.), and rated them on whether what 
they stand for is typically ‘ahead’ (=1) or ‘behind’ (=-1) the agent, or one ‘cannot tell’ (=0). Mean ratings 0 
indicate forward bias. While the overall mean for our visual nouns did not differ significantly from 0, that for our 
epistemic objects did. Precisely half had mean ratings significantly 0, the other half had means not significantly 
different from 0 (neutral). In the main study, our two key predictions were borne out by ratings for items with 
forward-oriented and ‘neutral’ patient nouns. 
18 
the items, respectively, and the task was combined with appropriate online measures. We 
provide results for each after outlining the relevant further methods. 
4. Pupillometry 
For our purposes, the major shortcoming of offline (outcome) measures like plausibility 
ratings is that they allow us to examine only hypotheses about conclusions which are 
automatically inferred and maintained. To examine separately which inferences are 
initially made automatically at the verb of interest (as per H1) and to what extent their 
conclusions are subsequently suppressed or maintained (as per H2), we can combine 
plausibility ratings with pupillometry or other eye tracking measures. Since we report the 
pupillometry study elsewhere (Fischer and Engelhardt, under review; see Fischer and 
Engelhardt 2017a for a pilot), we here focus on explaining the approach and give only an 
executive summary of methods and results, before reporting a fresh reading time study 
(Section 5). 
4.1 Approach and predictions 
Pupil dilations offer a window into preconscious automatic processing (reviews: Laeng 
et al. 2012, Sirois and Brisson 2014). Our pupils dilate when we are emotionally or 
cognitively aroused or expend cognitive effort. Pupil responses to task demands (as 
opposed to, say, changes in lighting) are highly correlated with neural activity in the locus 
coeruleus, a key node within neural circuitry that controls the muscles of the iris (Samuels 
and Szabadi 2008) and mediates the functional integration of the whole attentional brain 
system (Corbetta et al. 2008). Pupil diameter reliably increases with the ‘intensity’ of 
attention (Kahneman 1973) or cognitive load (the extent to which cognitive resources are 
mobilised to address a task). These pupil responses are spontaneous and impossible to 
suppress at will (Loewenfeld 1993); they are triggered also by subliminally presented 
stimuli the subject is not aware of (Bijleveld et al. 2009), and regularly commence well 
before any conscious task response. They thus allow us to gauge allocation of cognitive 
resources at pre-conscious stages of processing (Laeng et al. 2012). 
In language processing, difficulties which require cognitive resources to overcome 
arise from several sources. While psycholinguists have only recently begun to take up 
pupillometry on a larger scale, pupil responses have been found sensitive to syntactic 
complexity and sentence length (Piquado et al. 2010) and differences in the intelligibility 
of speech due to interfering noise (Zekveld and Kramer 2014), where dilations peak at 
medium levels of interference, suggesting less resources are allocated when the task 
becomes too difficult. The level of difficulty is generally also dependent upon the 
predictability of new text in the light of old: Processing is facilitated by activation of 
subsequent concepts by previous words, through associative priming (based on co-
occurrence of words) or semantic priming (based on activation of schemas and semantic 
knowledge, more generally). Accordingly, pupil responses have been found responsive 
to ‘surprisal’, that is, the predictability of the next word in a sentence, given its previous 
words, as estimated, e.g. by recurrent neural networks, on the basis of co-occurrence 
frequencies (Frank and Thompson 2012). By contrast, where new text violates 
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expectations and clashes with the conclusions of schema-based inferences, suppression is 
required and costs effort (Faust and Gernsbacher 1996). Accordingly, pupillometry has 
documented dilations in response to violations of scripts (social event/action schemas) 
(Raisig et al. 2012).10 
Our study used pupillometry to garner evidence of – inappropriate – stereotypical 
inferences supported by event schemas. While pupil dilations are initiated rapidly, the 
pupil takes over one second to dilate to its maximum size, after the point of difficulty 
(Engelhardt et al. 2010). Since it does not respond at uniform speed to all kinds of 
difficulties, it may, in this period, be influenced also by difficulties preceding or following 
the difficulty of interest. To minimise such influence, we created the difficulty at the end 
of our sentence items and compare mean pupil sizes after sentence offset with mean sizes 
in the previous time window (rather than considering time course). In our items, the 
difficulty of interest arises from a clash between the last part of the sentence and 
inferences from the prior verb (or verb and object). 
Our hypothesis H1 thus predicts that 
[Prediction Pupil] s-inconsistent, but not s-consistent, ‘see’-sentences with visual and 
with epistemic objects will prompt pupil dilations in the second after 
sentence offset. 
Since the combination of ‘is aware of’ with a visual object will activate the vision-schema 
at the earliest possible moment (cf. Bicknell et al 2010), i.e. at the object-noun, we also 
expect significant dilations in the sentence offset window for s-inconsistent ‘aware’ 
sentences with visual objects, but not with epistemic objects. 
Since pupil dilations are sensitive to effort expended at pre-conscious stages of 
processing, they can provide evidence of inferences, even where conclusions get swiftly 
suppressed and fail to influence subsequent judgments. This can happen where 
conclusions conflict with background knowledge or beliefs that get swiftly activated in 
language comprehension (Metusalem et al. 2012). In a study we ran jointly with the 
present experiment (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017a, Exp.2), we found participants’ 
plausibility judgments were highly sensitive to their content-related background beliefs: 
Two groups held opposing views on the issue at hand (whether homophobic attitudes are 
pathological). Pupillometry results suggested they made the same stereotypical inferences 
from the expression of interest (‘S is homophobic’), to conclusions (S is mentally ill) 
consistent with the background beliefs of one group of participants, but not another. Even 
so, the groups proceeded to give opposite plausibility ratings for sentences with sequels 
consistent and inconsistent, respectively, with the conclusions (e.g. ‘Tim is homophobic. 
He is mentally ill’ vs. ‘Joe is homophobic. He is mentally healthy’). Where initial 
conclusions were inconsistent with their background beliefs, participants suppressed them 
sufficiently swiftly and comprehensively to prevent them from influencing plausibility 
judgments.  
                                                          
10 Recent evidence suggests pupil responses may index conflict monitoring yet more reliably than cognitive effort 
(van Steenbergen and Band 2013). This would strengthen the case for using pupillometry to investigate automatic 
inferences through pupil responses to subsequent cancellation phrases.  
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In our paradigm, we therefore take pupillometry and subsequent plausibility ratings 
to measure different things: Pupillometry picks up inferences automatically made in 
incremental language comprehension and allows us to examine hypothesis H1. 
Plausibility ratings measure the extent to which inferences are successfully suppressed or 
influence subsequent cognition and let us examine hypothesis H2. 
The pupil is far more responsive to luminance variations than to changes in 
cognitive load (Beatty et al. 2000). Since the presentation of reading items on ordinary-
sized computer screens involves luminance differences as eyes move from the beginning 
of the sentence (when the visual field extends beyond the screen) to the centre of the 
screen, only few pupillometric investigations into language processing employ reading 
tasks (e.g. Frank and Thompson 2012, Raisig et al. 2012). Our study employs a listening 
task, which allows participants to fixate a fixation cross in the middle of a computer 
screen, throughout the trial.  
4.2 Methods 
Our thirty-eight participants were undergraduate students. All were native speakers of 
English. They heard sentences including 48 critical items, viz., 6 for each of the eight 
conditions (examples 1a – 4b, Section 3.1). Items in each category alternated post-verbal 
contexts (e.g. ‘s/he left behind’ and ‘s/he had turned away from’, for s-inconsistent items 
with epistemic objects) and employed the same epistemic patient nouns as the pre-study 
(Section 2.3). 
We used a 2 × 2 × 2 (context [s-consistent/s-inconsistent] × verb [see/aware] × 
object [visual/epistemic]) design and manipulated all variables within subject. 
Participants were seated at the eye tracker, given a set of verbal task instructions, and 
placed their chins on a chinrest. After a calibration procedure, they completed practice 
and experimental trials. On each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 1500 ms prior to 
sentence onset. The pre-recorded sentence was played out on the computer speakers, and 
after sentence offset the fixation cross remained on the screen for 1000 ms. After the cross 
disappeared, a plausibility rating prompt appeared, and participants rated sentences’ 
plausibility from 1 to 5, using the corresponding key on the keyboard. Mean pupil 
diameter was measured with an SR Research Eyelink 1000 in time windows including 
the second half of the sentence and the offset period.11 We baseline corrected the pupil 
diameter based on the preceding time window: We divided the mean size of the pupil 
during offset by the mean size during the second half of the sentence, for each condition. 
This allowed us to assess whether the pupil size was changing between time windows. To 
do so, we conducted one-sample t-tests with a test value of 1. A value of 1 would indicate 
that mean pupil diameter remained the same. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
All our predictions were confirmed. Pupil results are shown in Figure 1. 
                                                          




Figure 1. Baseline adjusted pupil diameter in 1000ms time window following sentence offset. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean.  
The s-inconsistent items resulted in larger pupil diameters. Crucially, participants’ pupil 
size significantly increased after hearing s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with visual and 
with epistemic objects. As further expected, there was also an increased pupil size after 
hearing s-inconsistent ‘aware’ sentences with visual objects, but no significant increases 
in the other conditions. However, while remaining shy of significance, pupil dilations 
after s-inconsistent ‘aware’ sentences with epistemic objects, clearly fell between the 
dilations observed in the other conditions with epistemic objects. We interpret this 
unexpected finding as evidence that the weak association of ‘aware’ with the vision-
schema still supports initial spatial inferences. 
Plausibility results are given in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Mean plausibility ratings for each of the eight conditions in the pupillometry study. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean. 
S-inconsistent ‘see’ sentences with visual and with epistemic objects were deemed less 
plausible than s-consistent counterparts (as per prediction Plausibility 1) and s-
inconsistent ‘aware’-counterparts (as per Plausibility 2). Items in all s-consistent 
conditions were judged distinctly plausible (mean ratings significantly above mid-point 
3), as were s-inconsistent ‘aware’-items with epistemic objects, while s-inconsistent 
‘see’-items with visual objects were judged distinctly implausible (mean ratings below 
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3), and s-inconsistent ‘see’-items with epistemic objects were deemed neutral (not 
significantly different from 3) (as were s-inconsistent ‘aware’-items with visual objects). 
Predicted plausibility differences thus materialised as categorial differences.  
Plausibility results cohere with pupillometry findings: Precisely in the three 
conditions with significant pupil dilations participants refrained from rating sentences as 
‘plausible’. The absence of more precise mirroring is consistent with ur view that pupil 
dilations and plausibility ratings measure different things (Section 4.1): We interpret the 
observed pupil dilations as evidence of automatic inferences – including contextually 
inappropriate spatial inferences from epistemic uses of ‘see’. We regard subsequent 
plausibility ratings as evidence of the extent to which suppression is successful. A purely 
epistemic interpretation of s-inconsistent items with epistemic objects (where ‘Jack sees 
/ is aware of / the problems he left behind’ comes down to Jack knows what problems he 
had in the past, see Section 3.1), renders these items at least as plausible as their s-
consistent counterparts (which then come down to, e.g. Joe knows what problems he will 
have in the future – that is notoriously hard to predict). We observe almost identical 
plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent and s-consistent ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic 
objects. If the vision schema was deployed in interpreting epistemic uses of ‘aware’, the 
initial spatial inferences unexpectedly suggested by our pupillometry findings were 
suppressed with complete success, and a purely epistemic interpretation attained, before 
plausibility judgments were made. 
This is different for items with ‘see’, which is more strongly associated with the 
vision-schema: Lower plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with 
epistemic objects than for s-consistent counterparts and for analogous ‘aware’-sentences 
suggest that inappropriate spatial conclusions inferred from epistemic uses of ‘see’ were 
not completely suppressed and prevented purely epistemic interpretation. Together with 
our pre-study, present findings provide evidence of contextually inappropriate inferences 
(from ‘see’) competent hearers make and presuppose in further cognition, despite 
knowing they are inappropriate. 
5. Eye tracking: Fixation times 
Philosophical thought takes place in reading and writing as well as in oral debate. We 
therefore followed up pupillometric investigation of automatic inferences in speech 
comprehension with a study that combined plausibility ratings with tracking of eye 
movements to examine H1 and H2 as hypotheses about automatic inferences in reading. 
This paradigm has the advantage of allowing us to localise the source of comprehension 
difficulties more precisely, as eye movements respond to difficulties more quickly than 
pupil size and display more intricate response patterns across different (early and late) 
eye movement measures. By exploiting these advantages, we can also close the remaining 
gap in the argument initially motivating our verb-specific hypotheses H1 and H2: We can 
now examine our suggestion that epistemic uses of ‘see’ are interpreted with the Retention 
Strategy (Section 2.1). 
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5.1. Approach and predictions 
Contrary to a common folk conception, reading is not a sequential process where each 
word in a sentence is read, one after the other, as they appear in the text, at roughly the 
same pace. Instead, the eye moves in stops (fixations on words) and starts (saccades). 
Readers tend to fixate most, but not all words, as their eyes move forward (skipping the 
words easiest to predict from the context) and backwards (‘regressions’ at points of 
difficulty). According to the ‘good enough processing’ approach that informs much eye 
tracking research on reading (Ferreira et al. 2002, Ferreira and Patson 2007, cf. Frazier 
and Fodor 1978) and is consistent with broader trends in cognitive science (Ferreira and 
Lowder 2016), hearers/readers immediately construct local interpretations over small 
numbers of adjacent words; if the task at hand demands it, and only then, they 
subsequently integrate these local interpretations into more comprehensive interpretations 
of longer sentences and passages, which take long-distance dependencies into account 
(Swets et al. 2008). In reading, we thus need to recognise words and integrate them into 
local and more comprehensive interpretations. Difficulties at these different stages 
manifest themselves in different eye-tracking measures (cf. Section 1.2).  
The difficulty of word recognition depends mainly on the word’s frequency, length, 
and predictability in the (local) context (Clifton et al. 2016, Rayner 1998). It is reflected 
in first-pass reading (fixation) times. A backward eye movement (regression) upon first 
fixation may indicate difficulty in integrating the word into a local interpretation. The 
regression path duration (sum of [1] all fixations on a word or in a region before moving 
to the right, plus [2] all fixations made during regressions in this period) reflects the effort 
required to overcome this difficulty. By contrast, difficulties in integrating the local 
interpretation of a sentence region into a more comprehensive interpretation will show up 
only in increased second-pass or total reading times for the region, and a higher number 
of saccades from it to other text (Clifton et al. 2007, Rayner et al. 2004). Difficulties 
arising from one sentence region may lead to longer total reading times for the next (n+1) 
region (Rayner et al. 2004). 
We wish to examine, first, our hypothesis that epistemic uses of ‘see’ are interpreted 
by retaining the dominant vision-schema and suppressing its contextually irrelevant 
components. Whenever an ambiguous word with a clearly dominant meaning is used in 
a less salient sense and disambiguated by immediate post-verbal context (still considered 
in constructing local interpretations), this increases first-pass reading times and 
regression-path durations on the disambiguating region, as well as the number of 
regressions from it (Sereno et al. 2006). Use of the Retention Strategy (Giora et al. 2014), 
however, implies more sustained suppression effort (Faust and Gernsbacher 1996) and 
should translate also into longer total reading times for the disambiguating region which 
are not entirely driven by longer first-pass reading times. In other words, this sustained 
effort should translate into longer total and second-pass (= total minus first-pass) reading 
times for the disambiguating region. In our critical items, ‘see’ is disambiguated by the 
visual vs epistemic object-noun immediately following it. Higher second-pass and total 
reading times can also be driven by regressions from the following post-patient context, 
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prompted by integration difficulties. In our critical items, such difficulties arise from s-
inconsistent, but not s-consistent contexts. Our hypothesis thus motivates: 
[Prediction EM1] First-pass, second-pass, and total reading times for the object region 
will be longer for ‘see’ sentences with epistemic than with visual 
objects, across all ‘see’-items and specifically in s-consistent 
sentences. 
The interpretation of epistemic uses of ‘aware’ will show a partially distinct pattern. 
Epistemic objects are more abstract than visual objects, and this fact alone increases early 
processing effort (Binder et al. 2005) and first-pass reading times (Schwanenflugel and 
Shoben 1983). But differences should show up in later processing stages. According to 
our initial assumptions, the interpretation of epistemic uses of ‘is aware of’ involves 
discarding the weakly associated vision-schema in favour of a different, purely epistemic, 
situation schema. Our pupillometry findings cast first doubt on this assumption and 
suggest that the vision-schema may be deployed to interpret epistemic uses also of ‘is 
aware of’. However, while salient, the visual use arguably is not as clearly dominant for 
‘aware’ as the visual sense is for ‘see’.12 The resulting weaker association of the vision 
schema with ‘aware’ than ‘see’ should then translate into less effort being required to 
suppress contextually inappropriate schema components, and more comprehensive 
suppression success. The latter success would manifest in plausibility ratings, the former 
effort in ‘late’ eye movement measures. Our initial and our modified assumptions about 
‘aware’ thus both motivate 
[Prediction EM2] Second-pass and total reading times on epistemic objects will be 
longer for ‘see’ sentences than for their ‘aware’-counterparts. 
These measures alone will not allow us to adjudicate between assumptions concerning 
‘aware’, but can provide evidence of the vision-schema’s retention in interpreting 
epistemic uses of ‘see’. 
Second, we wish to examine our key hypothesis H1 that competent speakers infer 
spatial patient-properties (X is in front of S) from visual and epistemic uses of ‘S sees X’. 
To do so, we construct sentences where visual and epistemic objects, respectively, are 
followed by sequels that are s-consistent (‘that lie ahead of him’) or s-inconsistent (‘that 
lie behind him’). We assume the previous text (e.g. ‘Joe sees the problems’) constitutes a 
local context, so the clash between the spatial inference and the s-inconsistent sequel will 
arise at the stage of integrating the local into larger interpretations (Ferreira et al. 2002). 
Difficulties at this stage show up in ‘late’ measures. From H1 we therefore infer 
[Prediction EM3] In ‘see’-sentences with visual and epistemic objects, total reading 
times will be longer for s-inconsistent post-object contexts than for s-
consistent counterparts. 
                                                          
12 While data on occurrence frequencies for different uses of ‘aware’ remains to be collected, participants in a 
production study used visual patient nouns about half the time to complete sentence-stems with ‘aware’, while 
providing completions resulting in a visual use of ‘see’ 94% of the time (Fischer and Engelhardt 2017b). 
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The relevant clashes can also show up through increased regressions. However, to 
keep our items as similar as possible to the pupillometry study, we placed these post-
object contexts at the end of the sentence, where regressions routinely occur as part of a 
‘wrap-up’ process, anyway (Rayner et al. 2000). We therefore make no predictions about 
regressions.  
Comparing total reading times for post-object contexts (see Table 2) in ‘see’- and 
‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects can help us adjudicate between assumptions 
about the processing of epistemic uses of ‘aware’: If the vision-schema is discarded for a 
dominant epistemic schema, processing effort should focus on the epistemic object, rather 
than the post-object context, and the consistency-manipulation should affect total reading 
times for the context region less than when the vision-schema is retained for interpreting 
the utterance. We assume the latter holds for ‘see’-sentences. Our initial assumption that 
the vision-schema is not retained to interpret epistemic uses of ‘is aware of’ then implies  
[Prediction EM4] Total reading times of s-inconsistent post-object contexts will be 
longer for ‘see’-sentences with epistemic objects than for their 
‘aware’-counterparts. 
Disconfirmation of this prediction would favour our modified assumption that the vision-
schema is retained in interpreting epistemic uses also of ‘aware’. 
Our final hypothesis H2 is, to repeat, that, regardless of contextual (im)propriety, 
spatial conclusions from both visual and epistemic uses of ‘see’ will be deployed in 
subsequent cognitive processing beyond utterance comprehension. This hypothesis is 
again assessed through subsequent plausibility-ratings. Mutatis mutandis, the above 
reasoning (Section 3.1) continues to apply and motivate two predictions (to repeat from 
above): 
[Plausibility-1] S-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences, both with visual and with epistemic 
objects, will be deemed less plausible than their s-consistent 
counterparts. 
[Plausibility-2] S-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences, both with visual and with epistemic 
objects, will be rated less plausible than their ‘aware’-counterparts. 
5.2. Methods 
Participants. Thirty-six undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
East Anglia, thirty women, six men, ranging in age from 18 to 26 years (M=19.83, 
SD=1.50), participated for course credit. All were native speakers of English with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Materials. The experimental items included 48 critical items, 6 for each of eight 
conditions. We adapted the materials from the pupillometry study (Section 4), controlling 
for word-frequency and length of patient-nouns (‘objects’) and post-patient contexts (see 
Table 2): The visual and epistemic object-nouns had very similar mean frequencies 
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(M=84.5, SD=70.6 and M=82.5, SD=69.4, respectively)13 and mean lengths in terms of 
number of characters (M=8.5, SD=2.2 and M=6.8, SD=2.2, respectively). Neither mean 
frequencies nor mean lengths differed significantly t(22)=.07, p=.95 and t(22)=1.82, 
p=.082. Similarly, the expressions used in the cancellation region were very similar in 
terms of mean lengths (visual-consistent M=10.7; visual-inconsistent M=10.3; epistemic-
consistent M=9.0; epistemic-inconsistent M=10.0) and of the mean frequency of key 
words (underlined) in each (e.g. post-epistemic: ‘ahead of him’, ‘facing him’, ‘before 
him’ vs. ‘behind him’, ‘has overcome’, ‘turned from’) (visual-consistent M=179.3; 
visual-inconsistent M=202; epistemic-consistent M=166; epistemic-inconsistent 
M=158).14 Critical items employed the same patient nouns as the visual and epistemic 
items in the pre-study (Section 2.3). There were 48 filler trials. 
 
  Verb  Object    Context 
 
Epistemic:   
1. Joe  sees   the problems  that lie  ahead of him. (s-consistent) 
2. Joe  sees   the problems  that lie  behind him. (s-inconsistent) 
3. Joe  is aware of  the problems  that lie  ahead of him. (s-consistent) 
4. Joe  is aware of  the problems  that lie  behind him. (s-inconsistent) 
Visual  
1. Sheryl  sees   the picture  on the wall  behind her. (s-inconsistent) 
2. Sheryl  sees   the picture  on the wall  facing her. (s-consistent) 
3. Sheryl  is aware of  the picture  on the wall  behind her.  (s-inconsistent) 
4. Sheryl  is aware of  the picture  on the wall  facing her. (s-consistent) 
 
Table 2. Example stimuli and regions of interest for eye movement analysis 
Apparatus. Eye movements were recorded with an SR Research Ltd. EyeLink 1000 
eye-tracker which records the position of the reader’s eye every millisecond (see Fn.11). 
Head movements were minimised with a chin rest. Eye movements were recorded from 
the right eye. The sentences were presented in 12 pt. Arial black font on a white 
background. 
Design and Procedure. The design was a 2 × 2 × 2 (verb [see/aware] × object 
[visual/epistemic] × context [s-consistent/s-inconsistent]). All variables were 
manipulated within subject.  
Participants were seated at the eye tracker and instructed verbally. They placed their 
chins on a chinrest. After a 9-point calibration and validation procedure, participants 
completed two practice trials and 96 experimental trials. These included 48 critical trials. 
Each participant saw ‘see’ and ‘aware’ versions of critical items in equal number, in each 
                                                          
13 Here and below, frequency figures refer to occurrence frequencies in the full written and spoken British English 
reference corpus of Leech et al. (2001). 
14 Since our predictions do not call for comparisons between reading times for verbs, the evident differences in length 
and frequency between ‘see’ and ‘is aware of’ are irrelevant. 
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condition, as verbs and context-phrases were rotated across lists in a Latin-square design. 
At the start of each trial, participants were required to fixate a drift-correction dot on the 
left edge of the monitor, centred vertically. The experimenter then initiated the trial. The 
sentence appeared after an interval of 500ms and the initial letter of each sentence was 
displayed in the same position, in terms of x and y coordinates, as the drift correction dot. 
The entire sentence was presented on a single line on the screen. The participant read the 
sentence silently and then pressed the spacebar on the keyboard. A plausibility rating 
prompt appeared, and participants rated sentences’ plausibility on a scale from 1 to 5, by 
pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. As before, endpoints were explained as 
‘very implausible’ (1) and ‘very plausible’ (5), and the midpoint (3) as ‘neither plausible 
nor implausible; the decision feels arbitrary’. The entire testing session lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. 
5.3. Results and discussion 
For eye movement and plausibility data, we defined outliers as means +/- 3.5 SDs from 
the mean. There were none. Analyses were conducted with subjects (F1) and items (F2) 
as random effects. 
Eye movements 
Our eye movement findings largely confirmed our predictions, which concerned reading 
times for object regions [EM1 and EM2] and for post-object context regions [EM3 and 
EM4]. Our findings were also consistent with the ‘good-enough processing’ account 
(Ferreira et al. 2002, Ferreira and Patson 2007), according to which initial shallow 
processing leads to local interpretations that are subsequently integrated into more 
comprehensive interpretations, in more in-depth processing (see Section 5.1). 
Accordingly, we found regressions from the final word of the sentence, in 90% of critical 
trials, and observed increasing responsiveness to our manipulations, in late than in early 
eye movement measures. We now first report omnibus tests mandated by the 222 
design, then report how our predictions fared. In a few cases, we examine predictions 
where the relevant omnibus tests do not provide statistical support for the requisite 
comparisons. 
Object Region 
First pass reading times on the object region showed no 3-way interaction and no main 
effect of verb (p’s>.25). Crucially, however, the 2 × 2 × 2 (verb × object × context) 
repeated measures ANOVA did show a main effect of object (see Figure 3): The 
epistemic objects had longer reading times than the visual objects F1(1,35)=16.28, 
p<.001, η2=.32, F2(1,11)=9.55, p<.05, η2=.47. As predicted, they did so also specifically 
in ‘see’-sentences (see-visual vs. see-epistemic t(35)=-2.36, p<.05). Since our norming 
work excluded frequency and length differences between epistemic and visual objects, 
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longer reading times for epistemic objects will be due to their more abstract character, 
which makes them more difficult to process (Binder et al. 2005). 
Figure 3. First pass reading times on object region. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
Second-pass reading times on the object region showed no 3-way interaction 
(p>.12) but did show a main effect of verb and object, and a by-subjects interaction of 
object and context F1(1,35)=5.04, p<.05, η2=.13, F2(1,11)= 2.31, p=.16, η2=.17. The 
object-regions of ‘see’-sentences had longer reading times than object-regions in ‘aware’-
sentences F1(1,35)= 36.20, p<.001, η2=.51, F2(1,11)= 63.77, p<.001, η2=.85. The 
epistemic objects had longer reading times than the visual objects F1(1,35)= 44.22, 
p<.001, η2=.56, F2(1,11)= 12.61, p<.01, η2=.53. As predicted by (EM1), this last point 
also held specifically for ‘see’-sentences (irrespective of post-object context) and, yet 
more specifically, for ‘see’-sentences with s-consistent post-object contexts: We found 
that epistemic objects had longer reading times than visual objects when considering 
‘see’-sentences irrespective of (i.e. collapsed across) contexts (t(35)=-4.96, p<.001), and 
when considering yet more narrowly only ‘see’-sentences with s-consistent contexts 
(t(35)=7.24, p<.001). As predicted by (EM2), reading times for epistemic objects were 
longer in ‘see’-sentences than in ‘aware’-counterparts, irrespective of (i.e. collapsed 
across) context (t(35)=-3.97, p<.001). Mean second-pass reading times for epistemic 
objects were numerically almost identical when followed by s-consistent and s-




Figure 4. Second pass reading times on object region. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.  
Total reading times on the object region showed no 3-way interaction (p>.17) but 
a main effect of verb and object (see Figure 5). The object-regions of ‘see’-sentences had 
longer reading times than counterparts in ‘aware’-sentences F1(1,35)=35.66, p<.001, 
η2=.51, F2(1,11)=70.15, p<.001, η2=.86,15 and the epistemic objects had longer reading 
times than the visual objects F1(1,35)=54.25, p<.001, η2=.61, F2(1,11)=11.22, p<.01, 
η2=.51. As predicted by (EM1), we also observed longer reading times for epistemic than 
visual objects when considering specifically ‘see’-sentence (irrespective of context) 
(t(35)=-5.67, p<.001) and when focussing yet more narrowly on ‘see’-sentences with s-
consistent contexts (t(35)=8.25, p<.001). As predicted by (EM2), reading times for 
epistemic objects were longer in ‘see’-sentences than in ‘aware’-counterparts, 
irrespective of (i.e. collapsed across) context (t(35)=-3.89, p<.001). Mean total reading 
times for epistemic objects were numerically almost identical when followed by s-
consistent and s-inconsistent contexts, respectively, in both ‘aware’-sentences and ‘see’-
sentences (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Total reading time on the object region. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
                                                          
15 (EM2) predicts this for sentences with epistemic objects. For a possible explanation concerning 
sentences with visual objects, see Fn.18. 
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To sum up, observed reading times for object regions were consistent with the 
predictions we derived from the hypothesis that the Retention Strategy is employed for 
interpreting epistemic uses of ‘see’. As per prediction (EM1), first-pass, second-pass, and 
total reading times for the object region were all longer for ‘see’-sentences with epistemic 
than with visual objects. Crucially, this also held specifically for s-consistent sentences, 
where total object region reading times are not liable to be affected by difficulties to 
integrate post-object contexts. The fact that total reading times for epistemic objects were 
the same across sentences with s-consistent and s-inconsistent contexts, in sentences with 
either verb, further confirms that higher reading times for epistemic than visual objects 
were not driven by greater difficulties to integrate post-object contexts and increased 
regressions from such contexts. Finally, as per prediction (EM2), second-pass and total 
reading times on epistemic objects were longer for ‘see’ sentences than for their ‘aware’-
counterparts. These findings support our hypothesis that epistemic uses of ‘see’ are 
interpreted with the Retention Strategy (Giora 2003, Giora et al. 2014). 
Context region 
While our predictions concerning post-object contexts only predict total reading times, 
we will get a better grasp of both sentence processing and eye tracking measures by 
considering also first-pass reading times. 
First-pass reading times on the post-object context region showed no 3-way 
interaction (p>.47) but a main effect of object and context (see Figure 6). Contexts 
following visual objects had longer reading times than contexts following epistemic 
objects (sic) F1(1,34)=11.57, p<.01, η2=.25, F2(1,11)=4.53, p=.057, η2=.29, and s-
inconsistent contexts had longer reading times than s-consistent contexts F1(1,34)=15.29, 
p<.001, η2=.31, F2(1,11)=20.55, p<.01, η2=.65. The remaining main effect of verb and 
the interactions were not significant (p’s>.45). 
 
Figure 6. First pass reading times on the context region. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
While striking prima facie, these findings are broadly consistent with the ‘good 
enough processing’ account (Ferreira and Patson 2007): At least in first-pass reading, 
readers only expend effort up to a threshold, tend to process subordinate clauses (like 
those containing our post-object context regions) superficially (Ferreira and Lowder 
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2016), and only attempt to integrate information beyond local interpretations where 
integration is easy enough. Abstract epistemic objects are more difficult to process than 
concrete visual objects (see above). Our findings suggest that participants made efforts to 
integrate information from post-object contexts already in first-pass reading only when 
reading sentences with visual, but not with epistemic objects – where integration efforts 
get deferred to later processing stages and show up only in second-pass or total reading 
times. This would account for the observed longer reading times for contexts following 
visual objects. 
Total reading times on the context region showed a significant three-way 
interaction between the variables F1(1,34)=4.88, p<.05, η2=.13, F2(1,11)=6.64, p<.05, 
η2=.38 as well as a main effect of object and of context (see Figure 7). Context regions 
following epistemic objects had longer total reading times (significant in the by-subjects 
analysis) than regions following visual objects F1(1,34)=5.33, p<.05, η2=.14, 
F2(1,11)=2.15, p=.17, η2=.16, and s-inconsistent contexts had longer reading times than 
their s-consistent counterparts F1(1,34)=21.67, p<.001, η2=.31, F2(1,11)=26.92, p<.001, 
η2=.71. 
 
Figure 7. Total reading time on the context region. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
To decompose the three-way interaction, we considered items with visual and 
epistemic objects separately. For sentences with visual objects, there was a marginal (by 
subjects) interaction between context and verb F1(1,35)=3.32, p=.077, η2=.09, though 
this failed to be confirmed by item analysis F2(1,11)=1.97, p=.19, η2=.15. Neither of the 
main effects were significant (p’s >.10). The marginal interaction arose from the fact that 
total reading times for s-inconsistent contexts in ‘see’-sentences were significantly longer 
than reading times for s-consistent counterparts t(35)=-2.20, p<.05, and marginally longer 
than for s-inconsistent contexts in ‘aware’-sentences t(35)=-1.86, p=.07. For sentences 
with epistemic objects, there was only a main effect of context F1(1,34)=20.80, p<.001, 
η2=.38, F2(1,11)=39.17, p<.001, η2=.78. Paired comparisons confirmed that s-
inconsistent context had significantly longer reading times than s-consistent counterparts, 
both in ‘see’-sentences t(35)= -2.43, p<.05 and in ‘aware’-sentences t(35)=-4.47, p<.001. 
These findings are consistent with our key prediction (EM3) about ‘see’ sentences: 
As predicted, total reading times for s-inconsistent contexts were longer than for s-
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consistent contexts, in ‘see’-sentences with visual and with epistemic objects. Reading 
times for ‘aware’-sentences, however, did not conform to our expectations: In ‘aware’-
sentences with visual objects, total reading times for post-object contexts were not 
affected by the consistency manipulation, resulting in (marginally) shorter reading times 
for s-inconsistent contexts than in analogous ‘see’-sentences. By contrast, the consistency 
manipulation greatly affected context reading times in ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic 
objects. As a result, total reading times for s-inconsistent contexts were not significantly 
different for ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects (t(35)=1.37, p=.18), 
pace (EM4). Indeed, reading times for s-inconsistent contexts in ‘aware’-sentences were 
even numerically higher than for counterparts in ‘see’-sentences. This finding favours our 
modified over our initial assumptions about the processing of epistemic uses of ‘is aware 
of’ (Section 5.1): It suggests that the vision schema is retained also for interpreting such 
uses of this verb. 
 
Figure 8. Mean total reading times for the three different cancellation phrases used after epistemic objects. 
Error bars show the standard error of the mean.  
To better understand the processing of post-object contexts, we considered the 
different cancellation phrases separately. After epistemic objects, we used three different 
phrases to create s-inconsistent contexts which clash with inferences that X is in front of 
S: ‘behind him’, ‘has overcome’, and ‘turned from’ all place patients behind agents in 
spatial schemas (cf. Section 3.1). Since each phrase was used in just two items, 
insufficient for a by-items (F2) inferential analysis, we only conducted a by-subject (F1) 
analysis. A 2 × 3 (verb × cancellation) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of cancellation F(2,70)=4.94, p<.05, η2=.12. Contexts with cancellation phrase ‘has 
overcome’ were read marginally and significantly more quickly than contexts with, 
respectively, ‘behind’ (t(35)=1.90, p=.066) and ‘turned from’ (t(35)= -3.56, p<.01) 
(Figure 8). Reading times for cancellations ‘behind him’ and ‘turned from’ were not 
significantly different from each other (t(35)=-1.07, p=.294). The interaction between 
variables remained shy of marginal significance F(2,70)=2.43, p=.096, η2=.065, 
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depriving more detailed comparisons of statistical support. Purely exploratory 
comparisons between ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences suggested a marginal difference for 
contexts with ‘turned from’ t(35)=1.83, p=.075. 
These differences clearly do not arise from differences in phrase length or word 
frequency: ‘has overcome’ is the longest phrase, and ‘overcome’ the least frequent word. 
Higher reading times for ‘turned from’ in ‘aware’- than ‘see’-sentences might arise from 
activation, by ‘turned from’, of the conceptual metaphor looking-at as thinking-about 
(Fischer 2018). This would lead to a perceived conflict between, e.g. ‘Kelly is aware of 
the possibilities’ and the implication from ‘she has turned from’, namely, that she no 
longer thinks about the possibilities. If ‘is aware of’ is more strongly associated with 
‘thinks about’ than ‘see’ is, suppression of this previously activated stereotypical 
associate would lead to higher total reading times on the phrase in ‘aware’- than in ‘see’-
sentences. If this is correct, higher reading times in these s-inconsistent ‘aware’-sentences 
would not be (mainly) due to spatial inferences, and these sentences should be disregarded 
in assessing our hypotheses. Exclusion of these items yields a mean total reading time of 
about 800 ms for ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects and s-inconsistent contexts. 
This is numerically below, though not significantly different from, the mean for the 
corresponding ‘see’-sentences (t(35)=-.401, p=.691) (Figure 7). 
The lower reading times for ‘has overcome’ than ‘lies behind’ may have an 
explanation in line with our Hypothesis H (Section 2..1): According to H, the salience 
bias arises where initial activation of contextually inappropriate schema components is 
not only strong (due to salience) but is also complemented by lateral cross-activation from 
frequently co-occurring component features of the relevant schema. We now assume that 
the vision-schema is retained to interpret epistemic uses of both ‘see’ and ‘is aware of’. 
In instantiations of the vision schema, the spatial-directional feature X is in front of S 
arguably co-occurs frequently with the spatial-vicinity feature X is near S (X ‘is around’). 
Hence these features can be more readily suppressed together than selectively, as one 
cannot be suppressed completely as long as the other retains activation. Our cancellation 
phrases all activate spatial schemas serving as source-domain scenarios of conceptual 
space-time metaphors (Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002, Gentner et al. 2002), but the 
schemas differ as our phrases carry different literal (source-domain) implications. 
Whereas ‘X is behind S’ implies that X is still around in the vicinity of S, ‘S has overcome 
X’ implies X is no longer present to S or around her. The activation of these subtly 
different schemas therefore either reinforces or inhibits the activation of the component 
X is near S that regularly co-occurs with X is in front of S, and thereby hinders or helps 
suppression of the latter. This would translate into greater integration difficulties and 
longer reading times for cancellation phrases with ‘behind’ than ‘overcome’. 
This explanation can be tested against further data. The account motivates the 
prediction [Plausibility-3] that s-inconsistent items using the different cancellation 
phrases should attract different plausibility ratings: By defeating the vicinity-implication, 
‘has overcome’ should facilitate complete suppression of the directional feature. S-
inconsistent items employing it should therefore be deemed plausible (provided s-
consistent sentences with epistemic objects are deemed plausible). By reinforcing the 
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vicinity-implication, ‘behind’ should make complete suppression of the directional 
feature yet more difficult. S-inconsistent items with it should therefore be deemed 
distinctly implausible. Finally, ‘S turned from X’ suggests X is still around (though S 
redirected attention) but implies this less strongly than ‘is behind’ (clearly leaving open 
the possibility that X moved or vanished since S averted attention). Therefore, ratings of 
items using ‘turned from’ should attract ratings in between. The fact that the vision 
schema is more strongly associated with, and hence activated by, ‘see’ than ‘aware’, 
would predict that suppression effort (evidenced by total reading times) is more 
successful in ‘aware’-sentences. As a result, ‘aware’-items should be deemed more 
plausible than ‘see’-counterparts across all cancellation phrases and are likely be placed 
in a higher plausibility category in the ‘mid-way’ condition with ‘turned from’. 
Plausibility 
Plausibility results replicated almost perfectly those from the previous pupillometry study 
(see Section 4) and confirmed our predictions. 
A 2 × 2 × 2 (verb × object × context) repeated measures ANOVA showed a 
significant 3-way interaction F1(1,35)=22.81, p<.001, η2=.40; F2(1,11)=20.77, p=.001, 
η2=.65, as well as main effects of verb F1(1,35)=45.71, p<.001, η2=.57; F2(1,11)=117.37, 
p<.001, η2=.91 and context F1(1,35)=430.87, p<.001, η2=.93; F2(1,11) =104.72, p<.001, 
η2=.91. Sentences with ‘see’ and sentences with s-inconsistent contexts had lower 
plausibility ratings. To decompose the 3-way interaction, and examine relevant 
differences, we considered visual and epistemic object-conditions separately (see Figure 
9). 
 
Figure 9. Mean plausibility ratings for each of the eight conditions in the eye tracking study. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean.  
There were significant 2 × 2 (context × verb) interactions in both the visual object-
condition F1(1,35)=56.89, p<.001, η2=.62; F2(1,11)=190.17, p<.001, η2=.95 and the 
epistemic object-condition F1(1,35)=14.06, p=.001, η2=.29; F2(1,11)=4.35, p=.06, 
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η2=.28.16 This allowed us to follow up with paired-samples t-tests. As predicted by our 
first key prediction [Plausibility-1], s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences were deemed less 
plausible than s-consistent counterparts both when they had visual objects (t(35) =21.87, 
p<.001) and when they had epistemic objects (t(35)=6.21, p=.001). 
Also the comparisons with ‘aware’-counterparts turned out as expected: s-
consistent ‘see’-sentences were deemed equally plausible as ‘aware’-counterparts when 
they took visual objects (t(35)=-.93, p=.36) and when they had epistemic objects 
(t(35)=.37, p=.72). The context-manipulation then significantly affected the plausibility 
of ‘aware’-sentences only when they took visual objects, and then affected it less than for 
‘see’-counterparts: ‘aware’-sentences with visual objects were deemed less plausible 
when s-inconsistent than when s-consistent (t(35)=9.66, p<.001). But s-inconsistent ‘see’-
sentences with visual objects were still deemed less plausible than their ‘aware’-
counterparts (t(35)=9.16, p<.001). As further expected, the plausibility of ‘aware’-
sentences with epistemic objects was less strongly affected by the context-manipulation. 
However, whereas in our previous study (Section 4), s-consistent and s-inconsistent 
‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects had attracted numerically almost identical mean 
ratings, in the present study mean ratings were numerically lower for s-inconsistent 
sentences than for s-consistent counterparts, and the difference was statistically 
significant t(35)=3.86, p<.001. Clearly, however, the context-manipulation affected 
‘aware’- and ‘see’-items to a different extent also when they took epistemic objects, and 
s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with epistemic objects were rated less plausible than their 
‘aware’-counterparts (t(35)=4.61, p<.001). Findings thus confirm also our second key 
prediction [Plausibility-2]. 
As in the previous study, the predicted plausibility differences translated into 
categorial differences: Again, s-consistent sentences with either verb and either object 
were deemed distinctly plausible, that is, attracted plausibility ratings significantly above 
the neutral mid-point ‘3’ (see-visual: t(35)=27.55, p<.001, aware-visual: t(35)=16.07, 
p<.001, see-epistemic: t(35)=7.89, p<.001, aware-epistemic: t(35)=10.51, p<.001), as 
were s-inconsistent ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects (t(35)=5.24, p<.001). S-
inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with visual objects were deemed distinctly implausible, with 
a mean significantly below 3 (t(35)=-10.40, p<.001), while such sentences with epistemic 
objects were deemed neither plausible nor implausible, with mean ratings not 
significantly different from ‘3’ (t(35)=.292, p=.772) – as were s-inconsistent ‘aware’-
sentences with visual objects (t(35)=1.86, p=.072). 
To assess our latest prediction [Plausibility-3], we finally considered plausibility 
ratings for epistemic s-inconsistent items by cancellation phrase (Figure 10). A 2 × 3 (verb 
× cancellation) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of verb F(1,35)=21.24, 
p<.001, η2=.38, as ‘aware’-sentences had higher plausibility ratings than ‘see’-
counterparts, consistent with previous findings. There was also a main effect of 
                                                          
16 The marginality of this by-item result is due to the fact that the by-items analysis is less powerful than the by-
subjects analysis, involving fewer degrees of freedom. Lower p-values are expected, and marginal by-item results 
do not impugn the significance of the finding (Cohen 1992). 
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cancellation F(2,70)=70.67, p<.001, η2=.67, with significant differences between all three 
cancellation phrases (all p’s < .05). The interaction between verb and cancellation was 
not significant (p > .30). Finally, all paired comparisons were significant (p < .05): In line 
with prediction [Plausibility-2], s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences of each kind were deemed 
less plausible than their ‘aware’-counterparts. And consistent with prediction 
[Plausibility-3], items with ‘overcome’ were rated more plausible than items with 
‘behind’, and ‘items with ‘turned from’ fell between the two. 
 
Figure 10. Mean plausibility ratings for see and aware for the three different cancellations. Error bars show 
the standard error of the mean.  
We again conducted one-sample t-tests to determine whether the means were 
significantly different from neutral mid-point ‘3’. Prediction [Plausibility-3] was fully 
borne out: S-inconsistent ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences with cancellation phrase ‘behind’ 
were deemed distinctly implausible (significantly below 3: t(35)=-5.67, p<.001 for ‘see’, 
t(35)=-3.15, p<.01 for ‘aware’). By contrast, items with ‘overcome’ were deemed 
distinctly plausible (significantly above 3: t(35)=6.86, p<.001 for ‘see’, t(35)=14.29, 
p<.001 for ‘aware’), and attracted mean plausibility ratings that were numerically even 
higher than those of s-consistent sentences with epistemic objects (cf. Figures 9 and 10). 
Items with ‘turned from’, finally, were placed into different categories depending upon 
their verb: ‘aware’-items were still deemed distinctly plausible (significantly above 3: 
t(35)=3.27, p<.01). But ‘see’-items were deemed neither plausible nor implausible (not 
significantly different from 3: t(35) =-.39, p>.70). 
Discussion 
Following on the previous pupillometry study (Section 4), present findings provide 
further and more detailed evidence that competent speakers make contextually 
inappropriate stereotypical inferences when the three conditions (i)-(iii) set out by our 
Hypothesis H are met (see Section 2.1): Our prior work showed that (i) ‘see’ has a visual 
sense that is clearly dominant. The confirmation of predictions (EM1) and (EM2) 
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suggests that (ii) epistemic uses of the verb are interpreted by retaining the situation 
schema associated with that dominant sense and suppressing contextually irrelevant 
components of this ‘vision schema’. Hypothesis H maintains that where (iii) these 
irrelevant components continue to receive lateral cross-activation from frequently co-
occurring schema components that are contextually relevant, suppression remains partial 
and contextually irrelevant schema components support contextually inappropriate 
inferences which influence further cognition (judgment and reasoning). Total reading 
times in line with prediction (EM3) provide evidence of inappropriate spatial inferences 
from epistemic uses of ‘see’. Plausibility-judgments in line with predictions (Plausibility 
1 and 2) provide evidence that inappropriate spatial conclusions influenced further 
cognition.  
Drilling down into differences between specific cancellation phrases provided 
further support for Hypothesis H, in the shape of evidence for the relevance of condition 
(iii): Where the cancellation phrase (e.g. ‘S has overcome X’), like the previous epistemic 
object, ruled out as contextually irrelevant both of two frequently co-occurring spatial 
components of the vision schema (X is in front of S and X is near S), both could be 
suppressed simultaneously, less suppression effort (reflected in numerically lower total 
context reading times) led to complete suppression, and no inappropriate inference 
influenced further cognition – s-inconsistent sentences were deemed as plausible as s-
consistent counterparts (as per prediction Plausibility 3). By contrast, where the 
cancellation phrase failed to rule out one of the two regularly co-occurring spatial features 
as irrelevant (‘turned from’) or even implied its relevance (‘lies behind’), this feature 
continued to pass on lateral activation to its regular companion. Accordingly, we observed 
numerically higher total context reading times and lower plausibility ratings, which 
provide evidence of inappropriate directional inferences and their influence on 
subsequent judgment. 
The comparison of ‘see’- and ‘aware’-conditions suggests that salience imbalances 
(as per condition (i)) are relevant for the cognitive efficacy of the inappropriate inferences 
examined. Total reading times for object and context regions displayed the same pattern 
for ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences with epistemic objects.17 This suggests that, contrary to 
our initial expectations, epistemic uses of ‘is aware of’ are interpreted, like epistemic uses 
of ‘see’, by retaining the vision schema and suppressing its contextually irrelevant 
component features.18 The visual use (where the verb takes visual objects) may be the 
most salient use of ‘aware’, but is not clearly dominant (see Fn.12), resulting in weaker 
                                                          
17 For both, s-inconsistency of context increased the reading times for context regions (Figure 7), but not for prior 
object regions (Figure 5) or verb regions (‘see’: s-consistent = 350ms, s-inconsistent = 340ms, no difference 
t(35)=.34, p=.74; ‘aware’: s-consistent = 730ms, s-inconsistent = 755ms, no difference t(35)=-.65, p=.52). 
18 In the visual condition, by contrast, we observed different processing patterns for ‘see’- and ‘aware’-items. With 
‘aware’, the consistency-manipulation did not affect total reading times for either the object or the context region, 
but did so for the verb region (s-consistent = 687ms, s-inconsistent = 804ms, a significant difference t(35)=-2.51, 
p<.05). With ‘see’, all three regions had higher total reading times, in s-inconsistent items (verb: s-consistent = 
338ms vs. s-inconsistent = 416ms t(35)= -2.38, p<.05). This suggests that the extra processing effort prompted by 
s-inconsistency was, in ‘aware’-items, devoted to switching to a less salient interpretation of the verb (e.g. from ‘is 
visually aware’ to ‘has seen and now knows’), but is spread across all three regions in ‘see’-items, where no re-
interpretation of the verb alone does the trick. 
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association of the vision schema with ‘aware’ than with ‘see’. Accordingly, similar 
amounts of suppression effort (as evidenced by increased total reading times for s-
inconsistent contexts) led to more complete suppression (evidenced by plausibility 
ratings), in ‘aware’-sentences: We observed higher plausibility ratings for s-inconsistent 
epistemic items with ‘aware’ than ‘see’ and, second, found that such ‘aware’-items were 
deemed distinctly plausible not only when contexts supported suppression through 
cancellations (‘has overcome’) that explicitly ruled out the contextual relevance of a 
schema component cross-activating the spatial component. Rather, s-inconsistent 
‘aware’-items were also deemed distinctly plausible when the cancellation (‘turned 
from’) remained silent on the relevance of ‘cross-activators’. Only when the cancellation 
phrase (‘lies behind’) reinforced the activation of this schema component (X is near S), 
and thereby the lateral cross-activation of the spatial component of interest (X is in front 
of S), did the critical spatial inferences from ‘aware’ go through and affect plausibility 
judgments. This suggests that, beyond unhelpfully phrased contexts, the Retention 
Strategy does not make us generally prone to inappropriate inferences which manage to 
influence further cognition. Rather, our findings provide evidence that it makes us more 
generally prone to such inferences when the polysemous word at issue displays 
pronounced salience imbalances and has a dominant sense far more salient than all 
others.19 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Main findings 
Two studies combining plausibility ratings with pupillometry and eye tracking, 
respectively, provided evidence of a salience bias in speech and text comprehension: 
Where a polysemous word has a clearly dominant sense (like ‘see’), utterances that use 
the word in a less salient sense may trigger contextually inappropriate stereotypical 
inferences that are licensed only by the dominant sense – and go through to influence 
further judgment and reasoning, even when hearers/readers know they are inappropriate. 
Our studies documented inappropriate spatial inferences from epistemic uses of ‘see’ and 
(to a lesser extent) ‘aware’; in a pre-study, participants drawn from the same population 
deemed such inferences inappropriate. Our findings suggest that inappropriate 
stereotypical inferences occur at least where pronounced salience imbalances coincide 
with an interpretation strategy (‘Retention Strategy’) whereby less salient uses of words 
are interpreted by retaining the situation schema associated with the most salient sense 
and attempting to suppress their contextually inappropriate conclusions. Where such 
attempts remain unsuccessful, e.g. due to continued lateral cross-activation from 
contextually relevant schema components, competent language users go along with 
                                                          
19 In line with the adaptive behaviour and cognition programme (Gigerenzer et al. 2011, cf. Ferreira and Patson 
2007), future research could fruitfully examine to what extent this apparent defect results from a system design that 
strikes the best balance overall between processing effort and accuracy of information inferred and retained, given 
real-world task demands. 
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contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences, despite knowing they are 
inappropriate. 
6.2. Philosophical relevance 
Our findings contribute towards an epistemological profile (Weinberg 2015, 2016) of the 
key process of stereotypical enrichment. This generally reliable process of automatic 
inference routinely goes on in language comprehension. It is bound to generate many 
intuitions thinkers have when considering verbal descriptions of possible cases, in 
philosophical thought experiments, and to drive many inferences they draw from such 
descriptions in philosophical arguments. The epistemological profile helps us assess the 
evidentiary value of these intuitions and to reconstruct such arguments. 
Philosophers often take familiar words which ordinary discourse may have 
endowed with a dominant sense and use them in a special sense (Section 2.2). They may 
do so to talk about unusual cases which deviate from the stereotype associated with the 
dominant sense (as envisaged in philosophical thought experiments, for example, about 
hallucinations or well-behaved zombies). Where this happens, thinkers are liable to make 
stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. When the conclusions of 
such inappropriate inferences strike thinkers as obvious, these intuitions lack evidentiary 
value. To acquire the right to treat intuitions about unusual (stereotype-divergent) cases 
as evidence, philosophers need to engage in psycholinguistic investigation at least into 
the salience structures of the relevant words. Already the first set of jointly vitiating 
conditions we have identified in the process helps us assess at least some philosophical 
case-intuitions. 
Where inappropriate conclusions are not explicitly endorsed but implicitly 
presupposed, the finding of the salience bias helps us reconstruct the relevant lines of 
thought and vindicate reconstructions in the light of plausible principles of charity which 
permit the attribution of fallacies to competent thinkers only in the presence of empirically 
supported explanations of why thinkers commit the relevant fallacies under relevant 
conditions (Thagard and Nisbett 1983). Our specific finding that competent speakers 
make inappropriate inferences from less salient uses of the verb ‘to see’ helps vindicate 
our proposed reconstruction of the ‘see-version’ of the ‘argument from hallucination’, 
which we took to rely on such an inference in its opening step (Section 2.2). Elsewhere 
(Fischer and Engelhardt, under review) we explain how related salience effects can 
account for fallacies in versions of the argument that employ the verb ‘is aware of’, 
instead. These empirically supported reconstructions help resolve this classical paradox 
and the ‘problem of perception’ (Crane and French 2015, Smith 2002) it engenders 
together with a parallel paradox (the ‘argument from illusion’, examined in Fischer and 
Engelhardt, 2016). 
6.3. Methodological lessons 
Our studies hopefully provide a useful model of how to combine plausibility ratings with 
pupillometry or reading time measurements, in the cancellation paradigm, to study 
automatic inferences. In conclusion, we stress three methodological points they may help 
40 
illustrate. In the cancellation paradigm, inferences are studied by manipulating the 
consistency of subsequent text with hypothesised inferences and measuring indices of 
cognitive effort. Due to ‘good enough’ processing strategies with initial focus on local 
interpretations (Ferreira and Patson 2007), increased processing effort engendered by 
inconsistencies may show up only in later reading time measures (second-pass and total 
reading times). It may also materialise with delay, namely, on the post-conflict sentence 
region (Rayner et al. 2004) and at the likely ultimate source of difficulty (on the region 
regressed to from the conflict region, as with our s-inconsistent visual ‘aware’-sentences; 
see Fn.18). 
Second, different eye tracking methods (reading time measurements and 
pupillometry) can provide complementary evidence but need not yield equivalent results 
on any specific measure. Our pupillometry study examined increases in mean pupil size 
between two time-windows, namely, the second half of the sentence and the 1000ms 
window after sentence offset. Such pupil dilations are indicative of cognitive effort 
involved in processing the second half of the sentence (Section 4.1). The reading time 
measure that comes closest to capturing this effort would be summed total reading times 
for object and context regions (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Total reading time on object and cancellation regions. Error bars show standard error of the 
mean. 
We observed pupils dilations for s-inconsistent ‘see’- and ‘aware’-sentences with visual 
objects and s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with epistemic objects. Despite the replication 
of plausibility results across studies, these dilations are not mirrored in these summed 
reading times, which are significantly different for visual s-inconsistent ‘see’- and 
‘aware’-sentences, while s-inconsistent ‘see’-sentences with epistemic objects do not 
have significantly longer summed reading times than analogous ‘aware’-sentences and s-
consistent counterparts.20 Some differences arise from the facts that in speech 
                                                          
20 Full analysis of summed total reading times showed a significant 3-way interaction F(1,35)=7.66, p<.01, η2=.18. 
Follow up 2 × 2 analyses, considering visual and epistemic object conditions separately, showed a significant 
interaction for visual objects F(1,35)=5.02, p<.05, η2=.13, and for epistemic objects main effects of context 
F(1,35)=8.19, p<.01, η2=.19 and verb F(1,35)=4.48, p<.05, η2=.04. We observed significant differences between 
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comprehension (involved in the pupillometry study) there is no ‘going back’ to sources 
of difficulty (as in reading) and that pupil dilations and reading times are affected by 
overlapping but distinct factors (Sections 4.1 and 5.1). More generally, more fine-grained 
measures need not ‘add up’ to a global measure and require independent derivation of 
predictions. 
Finally, plausibility ratings and online measures measure different things: In the 
cancellation paradigm, higher total reading times are indicative of extent of suppression 
and integration effort, at different points. Plausibility ratings reflect success of this effort. 
The two measures hence need not pattern together, since similar effort may lead to more 
complete suppression of irrelevant schema components, where associations are weaker 
(as we observed for s-inconsistent epistemic items with ‘aware’ vs ‘see’). Only the 
plausibility ratings tell us whether an inappropriate inference gets completely suppressed 
or goes on to influence further cognition. The moment we turn from psycholinguistic 
questions about sentence processing to experimental philosophy’s questions about how 
automatic inferences affect our judgments and reasoning for better or worse, we need to 
complement ‘online’ (process) measures with ‘offline’ (outcome) measures.21 
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